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Abstract 
 
 
This essay surveys macroeconomic issues that marked the transition from centrally 
planned to market economy in Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union 
countries. We first establish a set of stylized facts of the transition so far, namely: (1) 
output fell, (2) capital shrank, (3) labor moved, (4) trade reoriented, (5) the structure 
changed, (6) institutions collapsed, and (7) transition costs. We then critically survey the 
theoretical literature on transition, discussing various explanations for the initial output 
fall as well as medium term issues, such as optimal speed of transition, disorganization, 
institutions and sectoral reallocation as a source of output dynamics. Last, we review the 
empirical literature to assess how well it translates the theoretical models and explains 
the stylized facts. The essay concludes with a succinct list of suggestions for future 
research. 
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1. Introduction 
When the first signs appeared about ten years ago that the socialist experiment was 
finally over, surprise and optimism immediately followed. Surprise was caused by the rapid 
succession of communist regimes collapsing which culminated with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Optimism was justifiable.
2 The removal of the overwhelming apparatus of 
political control over economic activity could only mean prosperity in the medium term. The 
Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries were well prepared for rapid 
take-off: they were industrialized, they had reasonably educated and healthy labor forces, and 
population growth was minimal. Technology was lagging but with the free flow of information 
and Western assistance,  that could be overcome. Moreover, there was substantial technical 
progress in the defense sector that, maybe, could spill over the economy, reinforcing optimistic 
predictions. Some countries (notably Poland) had to tackle macroeconomic imbalances first, but 
for that economists felt well equipped. Prosperity was, finally, around the corner. 
Ten years have passed and the results are mixed, at best. The defining stylized fact of the 
first ten years of the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy is the massive 
output fall
 (see Figure 1). Although the myriad of data problems still prevents the full assessment 
of its magnitude, very few doubt its occurrence. Reported output fell in every single country of 
the former Eastern bloc. Indeed, real GDP in 1999 had surpassed its 1989 level in just two of 
those 25 countries, and in the most severe cases, the observed cumulative output fall was larger 
than 50 percent of 1989 GDP (EBRD, 2000).  
The objective of this paper is to take stock of what happened during the first ten years of 
the transition from centrally planned to market economy in the Central and Eastern European and 
former Soviet Union countries, and of the various theories and explanations that have been 
proposed. This is an ambitious but important task: arguably, the transition is to join the Great 
Depression as one of the most important economic events of the last century. Like the Great 
Depression, it will be intensely studied for the years to come, inter alia, because it marks a 
                                                                 
 
2 "The fact that transition came with an often large initial decrease in output should be seen as a puzzle. 
After all, the previous economic system was characterized by a myriad of distortions. One might have 
expected that removing most of them would lead to a large increase, not a decrease, in output" (Olivier 
Blanchard, 1997, p. v). Or, "[M]y prognosis was wrong. I did not predict the deep recession that followed; 
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fundamental break in the ways of organizing and going about economic life. Time is ripe to take 
stock of what we have learned in order to identify more precisely directions for future research. 
We chose to frame the discussion that follows in terms of economic growth after 1989. 
The reason for concentrating on the post-1989 period is the radical structural break that is 
currently taking place in these economies as the long-run trend is shifting away markedly from 
that established under communism.
  “Transition” itself can  be thought of as a change in 
underlying long-run trends.
3 For present purposes, this break is seen best in the drastic changes 
(still taking place) in the way savings are mobilized and investment is carried out, in the different 
ways labor is organized, in how prices are set, and in the full access to Western civilian 
technology and management practices. We also note that when economists talk about "economic 
growth," we have in mind growth of per capita income or of productivity over long periods of 
time. The reader should be made aware that in the literature on transition economies, growth is 
used in a more literal sense, that is, as referring to the short-run dynamics of GDP per capita or 
labor productivity.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section offers a descriptive analysis of 
growth performance in transition countries relative to other regions, and it includes a discussion 
of available growth accounting results. It goes beyond this decomposition and examines the 
importance of different factors that have been identified in the cross-country literature as being 
associated with growth. We summarize these ten years by means of a list of stylized facts of the 
transition so far namely: (1) output fell, (2) capital shrank, (3) labor moved, (4) trade reoriented, 
(5) the structure changed, (6) institutions collapsed, and (7) transition costs. In Section 3, we 
provide a critical survey of the theoretical macrodynamical literature on transition. We discuss 
the various explanations for the initial output fall as well as medium term issues, such as the 
optimal speed of transition, disorganization, institutions and sectoral reallocation as a source of 
output dynamics. Section 4 reviews the empirical literature to assess how well it translates the 
theoretical models and explains the stylized facts. Section 5 concludes with a number of issues 
that we believe deserve further attention.   
                                                                 
3  Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay and Carlos Vegh point out that “a useful way to think about the current 
growth prospects of the transition economies is to consider them subject to two sets of forces: those 
arising from the transition and transformation process, and the basic neoclassical determinants of growth. 
The further along a country is in the transition process, the less weight on the factors that determine the 
transitional growth rate, and the greater the weight on the standard determinants of growth” (1996a, 
p.231).   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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2. The Growth Performance of Transition Economies 
The objective of this section is to provide a set of stylized facts that summarizes the 
developments in the last ten years or so in a manner that is informative for theoretical work. The 
underlying question is what are the basic facts that a theory of transition should try to explain? 
After examining the key characteristics of growth before 1989, we highlight the difficulties in 
establishing the relevant groups of "comparator countries" and, assisted by the theory of 
economic growth,
4  set out in search of the stylized facts of the transition so far.   
Before proceeding, a caveat  about data quality and comparability is needed. These 
problems are many and are well documented (Kasper Bartholdy, 1997). Socialist statistical 
offices had a comparative advantage in measuring quantities, and were ill equipped to deal with 
issues such as price changes (let alone inflation) and unemployment. Moreover, the systemic 
transformation meant a radical change in incentives from fulfilling plan targets to evading taxes, 
from over-reporting to under-reporting output. Last, but not least, the initial y ears of the 
transition witnessed an extraordinary explosion in size of the informal sector or “hidden” 
economy (Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer, 1996; Friedrich Schneider and 
Dominik Enste, 2000). All these factors should be kept in mind during the following discussion. 
 
 
2.1 Before and after: The 1990s as a turning point 
After briefly examining the main features of Soviet economic growth, in this section we discuss 
the empirical evidence addressing the poor performance of the "Eastern Bloc" as a whole and 
present growth accounting results that yield a first decomposition of the main reasons for this 
poor performance. We believe the legacy of socialism is crucial to understand the first ten years 
of the transition because together with centralizing control,
 economic growth was an imperative 
of the socialist system by which its success was to be judged.
5 
                                                                 
4 Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995), Phillippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (1998), Steven 
Durlauf and Danny Quah (1999) and Jonathan Temple (1999) survey the literature on economic growth, 
and Gur Ofer (1987) surveys the literature on Soviet growth performance.  
5 According to Lenin: "Socialism calls for greater productivity of labor, compared with capitalism and on 
the basis achieved by capitalism" (cited in Kornai, 1992). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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What were the main economic characteristics of the socialist system?
6 Richard Ericsson 
(1991) summarizes the Soviet-type economy in 9 main characteristics: (1) hierarchical structure 
of authority, (2) centralized economic planning, (3) commitment to maximal resource utilization, 
(4) formal rationing through administered allocation in physical terms of producers’ goods and 
services, (5) rigid price control, (6) lack of true money, (7) the lack of  legal alternatives to 
assigned economic relationships, (8) arbitrary control by superiors of the norms and indices of 
plan assignments, performance evaluation and rewards, and (9) incentives geared towards 
meeting plan targets. 
Economic growth was an imperative of the socialist system. The pattern of economic 
growth pre-1989 was based on extensive growth, that is, it favored accumulation instead of 
technological and organizational changes (Ofer, 1987).  There seems to be consensus that the 
extensive growth strategy, achieved by rapid industrialization, worked rather well until the 
1960s.
7 As the first signs of growth slowdown appeared, it became clear that the technological 
gap with the West was opening  up. Two options were available: to create high technology 
sectors or to foment the diffusion of technology indiscriminately across industries. The 
leadership, in order to keep tight control, chose the former and channelled resources to the 
development of military technology. In 1973, the first oil shock gave the Eastern bloc some room 
to breathe, as the Soviet Union was a major producer.
 However, western economies responded to 
the two oil shocks with a boom in energy-saving computer-based technological innovations 
(Martin Baily and Alok Chakrabarti, 1988). The emergence and rapid diffusion of these 
technologies is often taken as a major contributor to the end of socialism (Joseph Stiglitz, 1994). 
Saul Estrin and Giovanni Urga (1997) document the growth slowdown that defined the 
last two decades of socialism. They investigate whether or not convergence took place among 
the socialist economies during the period 1970-1990 (see also Bart van Ark, 2001).
 They use 
time-series methods and annual data to assess convergence of GDP among countries of the 
Eastern bloc as well as between these and Western market economies. Although the finding of 
no convergence with the West should not come as a surprise, the finding of a marked divergence 
within bloc is somewhat intriguing given that a declared objective of the Council for Mutual 
                                                                 
6  Kornai (1992), Mark Harrisson (1998) and Serguei Guriev and Barry Ickes (2000) discuss the socialist 
system in detail.  
7 Worked “well” disregarding costs. In addition to rapid natural resources depletion, the gap between the 
Soviet Union and the United States in GDP per capita was much smaller than in consumption per capita William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Economic Assistance (hereafter, CMEA) was the equalization of living standards among its 
members. To state the obvious, within-bloc divergence meant that, despite the common 
slowdown, there were marked differences in growth paths. Over 1970-1990, one observes slow 
growth in Czechoslovakia, rapid growth in Romania and Bulgaria (especially in the 1970s), and 
cyclical movements in Poland. Turning to the Soviet Republics, one also finds divergence: 
contrast for example, in Table 1, the performance of Lithuania, Russia and Uzbekhistan to the 
ones of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.   
Explaining the growth slowdown is harder than documenting it. Growth accounting is 
helpful in depicting the slowdown. It provides for a decomposition of GDP growth and involves 
identifying the individual contributions of various factors to overall economic growth. The 
question that this methodology addresses is how important is factor accumulation relative to 
improvements in the efficiency with which capital, labor and other factors of production are 
used. The growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) is conventionally computed as a residual, 
as that share of overall growth that cannot be accounted for by increases in quantities of inputs 
alone.
8 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of two separate growth accounting exercises. Table 1 
presents results from Mark De Broeck and Vincent Koen (2000a) for the former Soviet Union 
countries. Table 2 present results using the data series for the Central and Eastern European 
countries from Estrin and Urga (1997).
 Both cover the period 1970-1997, and use data for labor 
and capital which were not corrected for hours worked or capacity utilization (thus the reported 
TFP results after 1990 reflect the impact of the transition). Moreover, in the two sets of results, 
the shares of labor and capital are assumed to be 0.7 and 0.3, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
(Abram Bergson, 1991).  
8 There are two simplifying assumptions that are commonly made in growth accounting exercises. One is 
on the form of the production function (a Cobb-Douglas with unitary elasticity of substitution being the 
norm). The other is on proxying the elasticities of output with respect to labor and capital by the shares of 
wages and profits in national income, involving the additional assumptions of perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale (Barro, 1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Table 1. 
Growth Accounting Results for Former Soviet Union Countries, 1970-1997 
  
    Output growth  TFP growth  Factor growth 
         
Armenia  Avg. 1971-97  0.9  -0.8  1.7 
  Avg. 1971-80  6.4  2.3  4.0 
  Avg. 1981-90  1.6  -0.6  2.2 
  Avg. 1991-97  -7.9  -5.6  -2.2 
         
Azerbaijan    Avg. 1971-97  -0.6  -2.9  2.3 
  Avg. 1971-80  6.1  2.6  3.5 
  Avg. 1981-90  0.1  -2.3  2.4 
  Avg. 1991-97  -11.5  -11.8  0.4 
         
Belarus  Avg. 1971-97  2.0  0.5  1.5 
  Avg. 1971-80  5.5  2.2  3.3 
  Avg. 1981-90  3.1  1.5  1.6 
  Avg. 1991-97  -4.5  -3.3  -1.2 
         
 Estonia  Avg. 1971-97  1.1  0.2  0.9 
  Avg. 1971-80  3.8  1.4  2.4 
  Avg. 1981-90  1.6  0.5  1.0 
  Avg. 1991-97  -3.4  -2.2  -1.2 
         
Georgia  Avg. 1971-97  -2.0  -2.8  0.8 
  Avg. 1971-80  5.3  2.7  2.6 
  Avg. 1981-90  0.0  -1.6  1.6 
  Avg. 1991-97  -15.0  -12.2  -2.9 
         
Kazakhstan  Avg. 1971-97  -0.5  -2.0  1.5 
  Avg. 1971-80  3.1  -0.4  3.5 
  Avg. 1981-90  0.4  -1.6  2.0 
  Avg. 1991-97  -6.8  -4.7  -2.1 
         
Kyrgyz Rep.  Avg. 1971-97  0.5  -1.7  2.3 
  Avg. 1971-80  3.3  -0.5  3.8 
  Avg. 1981-90  3.3  0.8  2.5 
  Avg. 1991-97  -7.3  -7.2  -0.1 
         
 Latvia  Avg. 1971-97  -0.1  -0.4  0.3 
  Avg. 1971-80  3.6  1.4  2.2 
  Avg. 1981-90  2.3  1.3  1.0 
  Avg. 1991-97  -8.6  -5.3  -3.4 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Growth Accounting Results for Former Soviet Union Countries, 1970-1997 
 
    Output growth  TFP growth  Factor growth 
         
Lithuania  Avg. 1971-97  0.8  -0.3  1.1 
  Avg. 1971-80  2.8  0.0  2.8 
  Avg. 1981-90  3.7  2.3  1.4 
  Avg. 1991-97  -6.3  -4.5  -1.8 
         
Moldova  Avg. 1971-97  -1.6  -2.5  0.9 
  Avg. 1971-80  3.7  0.6  3.0 
  Avg. 1981-90  2.1  0.9  1.2 
  Avg. 1991-97  -14.4  -11.9  -2.5 
         
Russia  Avg. 1971-97  0.1  -1.0  1.1 
  Avg. 1971-80  3.9  1.1  2.8 
  Avg. 1981-90  1.3  -0.3  1.6 
  Avg. 1991-97  -7.0  -5.4  -1.6 
         
Tajikistan   Avg. 1971-97  -1.9  -4.4  2.5 
  Avg. 1971-80  4.2  0.0  4.2 
  Avg. 1981-90  1.3  -1.9  3.2 
  Avg. 1991-97  -15.2  -14.3  -0.9 
         
Turkmenistan   Avg. 1971-97  -1.0  -4.6  3.6 
  Avg. 1971-80  2.4  -2.2  4.6 
  Avg. 1981-90  1.5  -2.0  3.5 
  Avg. 1991-97  -9.5  -11.9  2.4 
         
Ukraine  Avg. 1971-97  -1.6  -2.4  0.8 
  Avg. 1971-80  2.9  0.6  2.2 
  Avg. 1981-90  1.6  0.7  0.9 
  Avg. 1991-97  -12.5  -11.2  -1.3 
         
Uzbekistan  Avg. 1971-97  2.2  -1.3  3.4 
  Avg. 1971-80  5.0  0.4  4.6 
  Avg. 1981-90  2.3  -1.3  3.5 
  Avg. 1991-97  -2.1  -3.6  1.6 
         
AVERAGE  Avg. 1971-97  0.0  -1.3  1.3 
  Avg. 1971-80  3.8  1.0  2.9 
  Avg. 1981-90  1.5  0.0  1.5 
  Avg. 1991-97  -7.7  -6.4  -1.3 
Source: De Broeck and Koen (2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
  8 
 
Table 2. 
Growth Accounting Results for Central and Eastern European Countries, 1970-1997 
 
    Output growth  TFP growth  Factor growth 
         
Bulgaria  Avg. 1971-97  1.1  0.8  0.3 
   Avg. 1971-80  6.9  4.6  2.3 
  Avg. 1981-90  1.9  2.1  -0.2 
  Avg. 1991-97  -8.8  -6.2  -2.6 
         
Croatia  Avg. 1971-95  1.1  1.1  0 
  Avg. 1971-80  5.7  3.3  2.4 
  Avg. 1981-90  -0.8  0.9  -1.7 
  Avg. 1991-95  -4.2  -3.2  -1.0 
          
Czech Republic  Avg. 1971-97  0.5  -0.6  1.1 
  Avg. 1971-80  3.4  1.7  1.7 
  Avg. 1981-90  0.8  0.2  0.6 
  Avg. 1991-97  -4.2  -5.1  0.9 
         
Hungary  Avg. 1971-96  2.8  2.4  0.4 
  Avg. 1971-80  4.9  3.2  1.7 
  Avg. 1981-90  1.1  2.1  -1.0 
  Avg. 1991-96  1.9  1.6  0.3 
         
Poland  Avg. 1971-97  2.7  0.9  1.8 
  Avg. 1971-80  5.9  2.7  3.2 
  Avg. 1981-90  0  -0.3  0.3 
  Avg. 1991-97  1.8  0.1  1.7 
         
Romania  Avg. 1971-97  3.1  1.9  1.2 
  Avg. 1971-80  9.4  5.6  3.8 
  Avg. 1981-90  0.4  1.3  -0.9 
  Avg. 1991-97  -2.4  -2.4  0 
         
Slovak Republic  Avg. 1971-97  2.1  0.8  1.3 
  Avg. 1971-80  5.1  2.9  2.2 
  Avg. 1981-90  1.5  0.8  0.7 
  Avg. 1991-97  -1.6  -2.3  0.7 
         
Slovenia  Avg. 1971-95  3.7  2.6  1.1  
  Avg. 1971-80  5.7  2.7  3.0 
  Avg. 1981-90  -0.9  -0.3  -0.6 
  Avg. 1991-95  8.9  7.9  1.0 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Growth Accounting Results for Central and Eastern European Countries, 1970-1997 
  
AVERAGE  Avg. 1971-95  2.1  1.2  0.9 
 Avg. 1971-80  5.9  3.3  2.5 
 Avg. 1981-90  0.5  0.8  -0.3 
 Avg. 1991-95  -1.1  -1.2  0.1 
Note: The authors thank Saul Estrin and Giovanni Urga for generating these results  
using their data (2000). 
One important result from Tables 1 and 2 is the evidence characterizing the extensive 
growth regime and the exhaustion of its capacities from 1970 onwards. Not surprisingly, the 
pattern of extensive growth is more manifest for the former Soviet Union than for the Central 
and Eastern European countries as the average rates of factor growth for the former are 
substantially higher in all time periods. Although the general pattern of growth slowdown is easy 
to see, the structural break mentioned earlier is not. The trend reversal can be seen to date in very 
few countries (namely Poland, Hungary and Slovenia).
9 It should also be noted that declines in 
TFP are rather large vis-à-vis the decline in factor accumulation rates, indicating the rapid 
deterioration of the growth potential of the Soviet-type economy. Recall that this happens despite 
the increases in non-participation and in open unemployment (Blanchard, 1997), and despite 
investment falling below replacement levels (particularly, in the early transition years). 
A second important result De Broeck and Koen (2000a) establish is that the output fall at 
the outset of the transition is accounted for by declines in TFP rates. Yet, the year-to-year results 
referred to above show a “V-shaped” pattern in TFP growth during transition (large initial falls 
followed by rapid recovery). In order to investigate this issue further, they apply the cross-
sectoral decomposition of TFP proposed by Andrew Bernard and Charles Jones (1996). This 
involves separating out the contribution of productivity changes within sectors from that of 
changes in the sectoral composition to aggregate TFP growth.
 This second component is of 
interest as it will be positive if factors are reallocated from lower to higher productivity sectors. 
                                                                 
9 After 1989, the slowdown accelerates but it is reverts three or fours years later. These annual results are 
reported in De Broeck and Koen (2000a, Appendix Table A1). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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De Broeck and Koen (2000a) report that this component was negative until the late 1980s and 
turns positive after that.
10  
Because economic growth was an imperative of the socialist system, the reasons why the 
extensive growth strategy failed are (and will remain for some time) subject to debate, as they 
are part of the answer to the difficult question “why did socialism fail?” Two answers are the low 
productivity rates and the various rigidities in the economic structure, the latter well reflected in 
the low elasticity of substitution between factors of production (William Easterly and Stanley 
Fischer, 1995).
  It should also be noted that the reasons for failure can be identified in every 
single “growth determinant”. Regarding capital, the absence of capital markets in a regime of 
“investment hunger” reinforced the hiatus between the choice of investment projects and the 
rates of return on capital. In addition, the plan generated severe restrictions to capital mobility. 
The industrial structure was tilted towards heavy industry and against light industry. Services 
were considered, in Marxist terminology, “unproductive”. Among heavy industries, defense was 
the champion, creating an overwhelming burden and responding for the “hyper-militarization” of 
the Soviet-type economy. With respect to labor, we must recall that not only there was no 
unemployment under socialism, but also constant excess demand for labor. There was massive 
labor hoarding to cope, inter alia, with uncertainties in the delivery of inputs (to fulfill plan 
targets) and in order to maximize the amount of subsidies for the enterprise. The labor force was 
highly educated, although low morale was pervasive and the incentives for the allocation of 
talent distorted, all resulting in a low number of hours effectively worked. Last, but not least, the 
lack of technological progress is often associated with the absence of organizational innovation 
as there was no entry of new firms and, of course, no competition (Ofer, 1987).  
The growth slowdown of the economies of the Eastern Bloc is also useful to throw light 
on the overall economic conditions at the brink of the collapse, that is circa 1989. This is of great 
importance for our objectives because one main question the literature on the growth 
performance of transition economies in the 1990s attempts to answer is the relative importance 
of initial conditions vis-à-vis that of reforms. 
   Several countries introduced piecemeal reforms prior to the 1990s, in order to give more 
independence to enterprise decisions and develop some form of market behavior within the 
                                                                 
10 However, “the change in the share effect was small, however, indicating that sectoral input reallocation 
did not have a major impact on productivity” (De Broeck and Koen, 2000a, p. 20).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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planned economy.  Although there is a consensus on the negative impact of such half-hearted 
reforms prior to the full-fledged market reforms of the 1990s, it is becoming increasingly 
apparent that countries that experienced such partial reforms are better positioned now along the 
path of a more efficient market economy.  This observation appears rather natural if one views a 
minimal structure of market institutions and some experience with market oriented decisions as a 
precondition for the success of market reforms. The same effects of liberalization policies 
implemented in the 1990s were likely affected by initial conditions. Countries with less favorable 
initial conditions were more constrained in the reform process and thus followed a less radical 
reform path. At the same time, less favourable initial conditions might have adversely affected 
output performance. As a result, one would observe a positive correlation between reforms and 
output performance even though the ultimate cause of both reforms and output performance was 
the set of initial conditions. 
 One way of gauging the role of initial conditions in a comprehensive manner is to use the 
principal components technique. Within the set of initial conditions we considered (i) measures 
of initial distortions, associated both to the structure of the economy (namely the degree of over-
industrialization), and to policy induced distortions, such as the premium of the black market 
exchange rate over the official exchange rate; (ii) “natural” characteristics, such as the physical 
distance from Western European markets, and the endowment of natural resources; (iii) weight 
of the inheritance from the previous regime, measured by the time span spent under central 
planning;  and (iv)  the degree of development of market mechanisms, albeit primitive. This 
indicator of presence of some forms of markets is measured by the degree of price liberalization 
prior to market reforms.  We consider this indicator as one of the critical initial conditions.  
Indeed, our prior is that full-fledged market reforms can bring about a positive impact on growth 
when the system has a minimal structure that can lead to a positive response of the economy to 
the “institutional” shock represented by the implementation of liberalization and market reforms.  
Lacking such minimal structure there is the risk that liberalization and reforms can lead to output 
decline because of “disorganization” effects (Olivier Blanchard and Michael Kremer, 1997), or 
because of the development of dysfunctional institutions (Guillermo Calvo and Fabrizio 
Coricelli, 1996, Coricelli, 1998), such as corruption, barter, and payment arrears. 
   More specifically, the initial conditions considered are (Table 3): dependence from 
CMEA trade, a measure of repressed inflation, over-industrialization, the premium of black William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
  12 
market over official exchange rates, the number of years spent under communism, the distance 
from Düsseldorf, the share of population living in urban areas, initial income per capita, rate of 
growth of real output in the five year period preceding reforms, the presence of a national state, 
or of a federation of states or of breaking-away states.  All these variables are meant to reflect 
initial distortions and imbalances inherited from the previous regime.  We also include the value 
of the price liberalization indicator in the pre-reform period (from Martha De Melo, Denizer 
Cevdet, Alan Gelb and Stoyan Tenev, 1997).  Although simplistic, this variable may signal the 
conditions of each country in terms of the presence of a minimal set of market mechanisms at the 
start of full-fledged reforms. It largely reflects the half-hearted attempts during the central-
planning of introducing some independence in economic decisions by firms and some form of 
market mechanisms (partial liberalization of prices for instance).  Coricelli (1998) and Peter 
Murrell (1995) have argued that these rudimentary forms of market mechanisms may have 
played a crucial role in determining performance in the post-reform period.   
We use the method of principal components to isolate a limited number of vectors of 
significant initial conditions (see EBRD, 1999, for a similar approach). The first two principal 
components explain about 80 percent of the variance.  The first component attributes a large 
negative weight to initial liberalization, and large positive weight to initial distortions, such as 
repressed inflation, dependence on CMEA trade, black market premium, distance from 
Düsseldorf and years spent under communist regime. Thus, a positive coefficient on this variable 
in growth regressions would imply the predominance of the effects of initial distortions, while a 
negative coefficient implies the predominant role of initial market liberalization. The second 
component attributes large weights to initial income per capita and the degree of urbanization. 
This result  is important because it serves as a note of caution to the existing literature in its 
pervasive use of initial income as a general proxy for initial conditions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3   
Initial conditions using principal components 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
          First Principal Component       Second Principal Component 
_____________________________________________________________________  
 
LIIni      -0.598        0.043 
CMEA       0.751         0.315 
RepInf       0.823         0.109 
BMkt       0.940         0.137 
OverInd     -0.352        0.383 
State      -0.796       -0.397 
StateI      -0.558       -0.562 
StateF      -0.478        0.330 
TCOMM     0.902         0.019 
DIST       0.771        -0.423 
YpC89      -0.264        0.859 
Urban      -0.300        0.803 
GrIni      -0.190       -0.428 
NatRes       0.474        -0.147 
_____________________________________________________________________  
 
LIIni=Internal liberalization index in 1989;  
CMEA=Share of CMEA trade in 1990 over GDP;  
RepInf=Repressed inflation during 1987-90 (DDGT, 1997);  
Bmkt= exchange rate black market premium;  
OverInd=Industrial distortion measure (used in Berg et al.1999); 
State=0 for no own State prior to transition, 1 own State within larger State, 2 own independent State; 
StateI=dummy=1 if independent State before transition;  
StateF=dummy 1 if main state in federation state before transition;  
TCOMM=time under Communism;  
DIST=distance from Dusseldorf (in km);  
YpC89=real GDP per capita in 1989;  
Urban=% of population in urban areas in 1990;  
GrIni=growth of GDP per capita during 1985-89;  
NatRes=Natural resource endowment according to DDGT(1997), 0=”poor”, 1=”moderate”, 2=”rich”. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Authors' calculations.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Figure 1. 
Real GDP Index (1989=100) for Central and Eastern Europe 
and Former Soviet Union, 1989-1998 
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In summary, growth rates in the Eastern bloc have declined uninterruptedly from the 
1960s onwards. This slowdown has contributed significantly to the collapse of the socialist 
system. In the 1990s we see the deepening of this general trend in most countries and the reversal 
of it (a structural break) in few others. In our analysis of initial conditions, we find that initial 
income is an inadequate proxy and studies that use only this variable are likely to under-estimate 
the role of initial condition vis-à-vis other factors such as reform intensity. We now turn to the 
stylized facts of the transition years, of which the output fall is the first and foremost. 
 
 
2.2 Outpul fell 
As already noted, the defining stylized fact of the first ten years of the transition from a centrally 
planned to a market economy is the massive output fall. Output fell in every single country, with 
no exceptions, and it took longer than initially expected to recover. Indeed, real GDP in 1999 
surpassed its 1989 level in just two of the 25 economies in Central and Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet Union (EBRD, 2000). Figure 1 has annual GDP growth rates. It clearly shows the 
massive fall in output. It also shows that the countries of Eastern Europe experienced output 
declines that turned out to be much smaller than the ones observed, at a later date, among the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (hereafter CIS) economies. We discuss each of these 
issues in turn.
11 
 
                                                                 
11 In the next section we examine the various explanations that have been offered so far to the output fall.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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The output fall complicates comparative analysis. We are usually interested in learning 
about how do events in transition economies stack against countries at similar levels of 
development or per capita income. One difficulty in identifying which countries are “at similar 
levels of development” is that while the transition economies started out clustered in the upper-
middle income group
12, ten years later they are found widely spread over the rank of countries 
(by their level of development). In other words, the comparator countries change drastically over 
these first ten years: while in 1989 most transition economies were classified in the upper-middle 
income group, in 1998 very few remain in that category. This can be fully grasped if we name 
the “new neighbors” of the transition economies.
13 Among transition countries, Tajikistan and 
the Kyrgyz Republic have the lowest GNP per capita in 1998 (followed by Moldova),
 while 
Slovenia has the highest (followed by the Czech Republic and Croatia, respectively). The median 
transition economy is Kazakhstan. Bangladesh is the developing country with the same GNP per 
capita in 1998 as Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Haiti and Mauritania are the countries with 
approximately the same GNP per capita in 1998 as Moldova. At the other extreme of this 
distribution, the country immediately above Slovenia is Portugal,
14 and the one immediately 
below is Argentina. The Czech Republic ranks between Uruguay and Chile, while Croatia ranks 
between Brazil and Hungary. 
The dispersion in the transition group has increased substantially since 1989 and this list 
of countries in close positions helps to underline the difficulties in establishing the relevant 
comparison group of countries at similar levels of development.
15 Most of the former Soviet 
Union countries end this period as low income or lower-middle income, while the majority of the 
                                                                 
12 The World Bank ranks countries by their level of economic development, using as criterion (1998) 
GNP per capita (exchange rates conversion). “The groups are: low-income, $760 or less; lower-middle-
income, $761-$3,030; upper-middle-income, $3,031-$9,630; and high-income: $9,361 or more” (World 
Bank, 1999/2000  World Development Report, p. 291).  
13 The source is the 1999/2000 World Development Report. Data availability impedes to base this analysis 
upon PPP per capita GNP figures.   
14 According to the 1999/2000 World Development Report, Slovenia is the only “high income” country in 
this sample of 25 transition economies.   
15 As for levels of development, one can argue that income per capita alone does not do justice to the 
years of effort to improve social conditions (e.g., education and health) that characterized the socialist 
regimes. UNDP (1998) ranks 174 countries according to their “human development index” (which 
reflects, in addition to income, life expectancy and education attainment.) Our sample of 25 transition 
economies stretches from the 37
th (Slovenia, immediately preceded by Argentina and followed by 
Uruguay) to the 118
th place (Tajikistan, immediately preceded by Cape Verde and followed by 
Honduras). The median country is Macedonia (in 80
th place), immediately preceded by Lithuania and 
followed by Syria. In sum, the dispersion seems to have increased also along these lines. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Central and Eastern Europeans (and Baltic) countries in the late 1990s are classified as upper-
middle income economies. 
A major caveat in assessing the depth of the output fall is that it refers to official 
estimates and thus ignores the shadow economy or informal sector. The latter has grown very 
rapidly in the early transition years and the way researchers have measured it is using electricity 
consumption as a more encompassing measure of economic activity. It is reassuring to note that 
the output fall also obtains using an electricity consumption index (Johnson, Kaufmann and 
Shleifer, 1997). For example, in its lowest point the GDP index of Visegrad countries was 85 per 
cent of its 1990 GDP level while the corresponding value of the electricity consumption index 
was 90 per cent. At the other extreme, the trough values of GDP and electricity consumption 
indexes for the Central Asian countries were only 46 and 62 per cent, respectively. In most 
countries, total activity seems to have declined less than what the official figures suggest. Yet the 
output fall obtains irrespective of the measure chosen. It is important, however, to keep in mind 
that consumption fell less than output. 
 
 
2.3 Capital shrank 
Compared to advanced  market economies, investment under central planning was high and 
inefficient. Voluntary savings during the transition, carried out by households and private 
enterprises in a market economy, would tend to be lower than forced centralized savings under 
planning. Thus, the expectation was that market forces would improve investment efficiency but 
sustain investment rates at lower levels than under central planning. On the other hand, the 
process of economic transformation would require additional investment to account for 
restructuring and for the upgrading of outdated products and production processes. A lot was 
expected from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Foreign capital could not only bridge the 
possible medium-term gap between domestic savings and investment needs but also help in 
restructuring and modernizing transition economies. In order to trace the actual behavior of 
domestic investment and foreign participation during the transition, in what follows we analyze 
data on gross domestic fixed investment (GFDI) as a share of GDP as well as some aggregate 
FDI indicators.
16  
                                                                 
16 Data availability still prevents a full assessment of the role of natural capital (Thorvaldur Gylfason, 
2001). We discuss human capital in the next sub-section. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Table 4 
Aggregate Investment as Percentage of GDP 
Regional Averages: 1990-1998 
 
                   
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
                   
BALTICS  24.78  16.52  18.40  20.43  21.66  21.38  22.62  23.67  24.51 
BALKAN  18.49  13.23  14.94  14.88  15.68  16.99  19.17  18.30  18.63 
VISEGRAD  24.01  22.48  22.99  22.74  23.20  23.92  26.72  27.77  28.36 
ASIA  28.74  20.44  18.38  15.50  17.21  17.34  20.37  18.66  19.05 
BUR  24.64  21.85  25.51  26.18  26.19  23.07  21.22  21.20  20.95 
                   
CEEB  22.43  17.41  18.78  19.35  20.18  20.76  22.84  23.25  23.83 
CIS  25.92  21.58  21.68  22.37  22.05  21.84  22.30  19.87  19.41 
                   
Notes: Authors' calculations using 2000 World Development Indicators data. See text for 
definition of regional groups.  
 
Table 4 shows investment rates between 1990 and 1998.
17 With respect to aggregate 
investment activity during transition, two main observations should be made. First, that 
investment has fallen more than GDP, and thus investment rates declined and, second, that the 
latter decline was smaller than is usually the case in demand driven recessions in advanced 
market economies ((Jacek Rostowski, 1997; Stanislaw Gomulka, 1998). Table 4 shows that 
investment ratios declined sharply at the beginning of the transition. In the case of CEEB, this 
decline was 32 per cent between 1989 and 1991, the trough year. Investment rates have 
recovered and and reached more than 80 per cent of the 1989 level in 1998. The decline was 
more severe in the CIS countries. Not only the latter started with higher investment rates, but as 
late as 1998 there are no clear signs of a recovery. 
Although a broadly similar pattern in the development of investment to GDP ratio can be 
observed in all five subgroups in the region, three additional comments are noteworthy. First, the 
poor performance of the CIS average seems to be driven by the ASIA group, while the latter’s 
average is dominated by war affected countries of the Caucasus region. Indeed, it seems that for 
                                                                 
17 We divided the sample in five groups for exposition purposes. The transition countries in ASIA are 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The 
BALKAN countries are Albania , Bulgaria, Croatia , Macedonia, Moldova and Romania. The BALTIC 
countries are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The group called  BUR comprises  Belarus, Ukraine and 
Russia. The VISEGRAD countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and  Slovenia. 
CEEB stands for Central and Eastern European and Baltic countries and represents the sum of the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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BUR the decline in the rate of fixed investment was very much in line to that of CEEB countries. 
The investment rate decreased during 1989-91 and then had a very weak and tentative recovery. 
In contrast, the pattern of investment behaviour in Asia was much different, as the ratio dropped 
drastically from 1990 to 1994 and only then tentatively started to stabilize. A second remark is 
that the Vysegrad group stands out for the relative mildness of the initial decline in the rate of 
investment. And third, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia experienced a reversal in the series from an 
upward to a downward trend in 1994. This reversal took place after three years of stability in the 
BUR investment rate during 1992-94 and sharply contrasted with the behaviour of investment to 
GDP ratios in other subgroups.  
How do gross domestic investment rates of transition economies compare to the average 
investment rates in countries at similar income levels? Investment rates in transition economies 
range from 14 to 28 percent of GDP, and for 1998 only three out of our five groups have 
averages above 20 percent.
 The often heard concern about these figures being too low must be 
echoed here (and particularly so regarding the countries in the BALKAN and ASIA groups.) In 
1995, investment rates averaged 30 percent for low-income economies, 23 percent for both 
lower-middle economies and upper-middle economies, and 19 percent for high-income 
economies.
18 Given the current level of development of m ost transition economies, their 
investment rates are indeed low.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
BALTIC, BALKAN and VISEGRAD sub-groups. 
18 Source is World Bank, 1999/2000 World Development Report. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Table 5 
Foreign Direct Investment in Transition Economies 
 
         
  Cumulative FDI 
inflows, 1988-99 
(Billion dollars) 
Cumulative FDI 
inflows as % of 
GDP, 1988-99   
Cumulative FDI 
inflows per capita, 
1988-99 (dollars) 
Average FDI inflow as %  
of gross domestic 
investment, 1997-99 
         
BALTIC  2.10  30.27  923.67  27.00 
BALKANS  2.07  16.85  277.50  21.40 
VISEGRAD  14.41  22.30  1122.80  13.40 
ASIA  1.73  32.35  183.00  39.28 
BUR  8.17  9.37  91.00  7.33 
         
CEEB  6.19  23.14  774.66  20.60 
CIS  4.95  20.85  137.00  23.31 
         
Notes: Authors' calculations using data from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe's 
Economic Survey of Europe (2001, no.1).  See text for definition of regional groups.  
 
Since the start of transition, FDI inflows have been rising constantly but their magnitude 
and importance remain highly unequal among country subgroups.
19 Table 5 shows four different 
aspects of the performance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in transition economies. These 
are: cumulative FDI inflows, cumulative FDI inflows as a share of GDP, cumulative FDI inflows  
per capita and the average FDI inflows as share of domestic gross fixed capital formation. 
Interestingly, each indicator shows a slightly different picture. For example, in terms of 
cumulative FDI inflows, the considerable differences between CEEB and CIS countries (the FDI 
stock in the average CEEB country is larger than in the average CIS country) pale with respect to 
differences at the level of sub-groups. FDI is highly concentrated: the VISEGRAD and BUR (in 
this case, predominantly Russia) groups account for about 80% of the total stock of FDI in 
transition economies. 
If we examine cumulative FDI inflows over 1988-1999 as a share of GDP, the 
conclusions are different. Although this share is still higher in CEEB than in CIS countries, the 
BALTIC and ASIA groups, respectively, are the ones driving up these averages. In the case of 
ASIA, we should mention that for Azerbaijan, the ratio of cumulative FDI inflows over GDP is 
                                                                 
19 Nauro Campos and Yuko Kinoshita (2001) provide a full discussion of growth impacts of FDI in 
transition.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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above 90%. This ratio is also very high (about 45%) for Kazakhstan. For the Baltic countries, 
this ratio ranges from about 38% for Estonia to about 20% in the case of Lithuania. The measure 
of net FDI inflows relative to countries’ GDP has been somewhat more dynamic since 1994 and 
hints that FDI is rapidly gaining importance not only in the Baltic countries but also in Asia. For 
this latter group, the average rate of foreign direct investment went up from a mere 1 percent in 
1994 to almost 35 per cent of GDP in 1999. It should be noted that natural resources (oil and 
natural gas) are one of the most important determinants of such high FDI flows to ASIA. 
  It is in terms of cumulative per capita FDI inflows that the gap between the CIS and 
CEEB is wider. The Vysegrad countries have maintained a leading position, with cumulative 
FDI inflow per capita reaching about $1200 by 1999. Balkan, BUR, and Asia groups remain far 
behind as the amount of cumulative per capita FDI was just $300 or less, while $950 stock of per 
capita FDI in the Baltic countries place them in between these two extremes.   
The FDI to domestic investment ratio shows a relatively similar picture to that implied by 
the FDI-to-GDP ratios. The share of FDI in domestic investment has been rising in all countries 
except in the Vysegrad group, where the share has been relatively flat. Considering the average 
over 1997-1999, notice the very high average for the ASIA group. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Georgia and Armenia all show FDI to domestic investment ratios of at least 45%.  
  In summary, capital accumulation slowed down considerably during the transition period. 
Capital shrank. In the CEEB countries, investment rates have already shown a timid recovery, 
while in the CIS countries the declined does not seem to have been reversed yet. FDI has played 
a substantial role in transition economies particularly for its role as carrier of new technologies, 
but it has been concentrated in very few countries and unable by itself to reverse the trends in 
aggregate investment. 
 
 
2.4 Labor moved 
The previous section tried to answer what happened to physical capital during the transition. This 
section addresses the question of what happened to labor during the transition. The difference in 
answers is telling in terms of the needs for future research. It seems we know much less about 
what happened to the stock of capital from the communist period than about increases to that 
stock during the transition period. For instance, we know quite a bit about domestic and foreign William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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direct investment. But we do not know much about what happened to communist capital (did it 
depreciate very fast? How much of it was reallocated to the emerging private and informal 
sectors?) On the other hand, when it comes to labor, we know quite a bit of what happened in 
terms of participation rates and labor markets flows, but we know little about how the huge 
stocks of human capital accumulated under communism were valued during the transition.
20 
  Labor is a fundamental determinant of growth,
  because of the sheer size of the labor 
force as well as the quality of the labor input (human capital).  As for the former, the literature 
tends to focus on population size and growth, under the assumption that differences in 
participation rates and demographic structure are negligible over the long run.
 The conventional 
wisdom, that these economies have quite low rates of population growth, is confirmed and marks 
one of the indisputable differences between economies in transition and the rest of the 
developing countries. The average annual population growth rate  across transition economies is 
0.21 percent.
21 The same average in 1990-1998 is 2.0 percent for low-income economies, 1.4 
percent for lower middle-income economies, 1.6 percent for upper middle-income economies, 
and 0.7 percent for high-income economies.
22 Although average population growth is low, there 
are exceptions: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan all show average annual population 
growth rates well above 2 percent (Armenia follows with a 1.29 percent average).  
An important aspect of labor developments in transition is the change in participation 
rates (Tito Boeri, 2000). Participation rates were relatively high under socialism, in particular 
female participation rates. The initial output shock was followed by a drastic adjustment in this 
regard and CEEB and CIS averages are similar: declines in participation rates of approximately 3 
and 2.5 percentage points, respectively, in the fist five years of the transition. There is one 
exception: Romania shows an increase in participation rates between 1990 and 1995 (from 68 to 
75 percent). This contributes to the BALKAN group showing the lowest average: a decline of 
about 0.5 percentage points. On the other extreme, the highest average changes in participation 
rates in the first five years are for the Visegrad countries (decline of 5.8 percentage points). Also 
note that the average in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine is above that of the Baltic countries (during 
                                                                 
20  Jan Švejnar (1999) and Randall Filer, Thorvaldur Gylfason, Stepan Jurajda and Janet Mitchell (2000) 
survey this literature. 
21  These low rates also reflect the demographic situation in the transition economies, where the increasing 
dependency ratios are usually thought of as having negative fiscal consequences. For a discussion, see 
Coricelli (1997).   
22 The source is World Bank, 1999/2000 World Development Report.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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the period 1990 to 1995). This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that empirical 
research strongly suggests that in BUR countries labour market adjustment took the form of 
delayed payments or wage arrears (see Hartmut Lehmann, Jonathan Wadsworth and Alessandro 
Acquisti, 1999). In a nutshell, there was a significant increase in flows out of the labour force 
that helps us start to characterise as a stylized fact of the transition that “labour moved.” 
Another important aspect of labor market adjustment was through unemployment. As 
noted, a characteristic of the socialist economy was the excess demand for labour (Kornai, 1992).  
Unemployment rates during the transition process, therefore, grew very rapidly but from a low 
starting level. Table 6 shows registered unemployment rates.
23 The trend of increasing 
unemployment rates is clear. One first noteworthy observation is that unemployment rates 
increased much faster in the Central and Eastern European countries than in the CIS countries. It 
is worrisome that it has reached double-digit rates very early (1993) and, ever more worrisome, 
that these rates have stayed above 10% until the end of the decade.  
 
Table 6 
Registered Unemployment Rates  
Regional Averages: 1990-1999 
 
                     
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                     
BALTIC  0.55  0.80  2.97  6.57  9.37  15.13  15.27  12.87  12.40  13.60 
BALKAN  7.80  9.23  15.52  16.58  14.92  14.97  13.28  13.90  14.70  15.58 
VISEGRAD  2.55  8.28  8.98  11.06  10.72  9.70  9.34  8.42  9.78  11.20 
ASIA  n.a.  0.44  4.18  4.45  4.57  5.76  6.57  7.29  8.80  9.48 
BUR  n.a.  0.05  2.00  2.57  3.40  4.07  5.03  5.43  6.43  6.03 
                     
CEEB  3.63  6.10  9.15  11.40  11.67  13.27  12.63  11.73  12.29  13.46 
CIS  n.a.  0.25  3.09  3.51  3.99  4.91  5.80  6.36  7.62  7.76 
                   
Notes: Authors' calculations using EBRD (2000) data. See text for definition of regional groups. 
n.a. indicates data not available.
                                                                 
23 Tito Boeri and Katherine Terrell (2002) discuss the problems with this measure with emphasis on the 
role of changing institutional features.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Table 6 also shows the breakdown of average registered unemployment rates across the 
five sub-groups. Starting with the former Soviet Union countries, it is important to mention that 
although the BUR averages are consistently below those of the ASIA group, it conceals the fact 
that Russian unemployment figures have been four times larger than those for Belarus or 
Ukraine, throughout. The ASIA average is kept lower thanks to the Central Asian countries that 
show average rates much lower than those for the Caucasus countries. Now turning to the CEEB 
sub-groups, note that the average rates for the Balkan countries peak early on and stay high 
throughout. In this group, we have Macedonia for example with registered unemployment rates 
never below 18 percent (and peaking at almost 38% in 1997). It is also remarkable how the 
behavior of unemployment rates in the Baltic countries resemble much more those in Central and 
Eastern Europe than those in the CIS. Finally, note that in terms of unemployment rates in the 
Visegrad countries, the Czech figures are the lowest ones in all years but 1999, when Slovenian 
rates become the lowest rates in this group (at 7.4%).  
Let us now turn to the issue of human capital in transition. Conventional wisdom holds 
that if there is one area where the countries of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union are well 
served it is with respect to their stocks of human capital. Most human capital indicators (e.g., 
gross or net enrollments, average years of schooling, and literacy rates) tend to be better in these 
countries than in the OECD (Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, 2001). Yet recent research shows 
that not all is well in this front. Boeri (2000) highlights the fact that skills acquired under 
communism are overly specialized and therefore not easily transferable. He exemplifies by 
noting that secondary education in Poland offered more than 700 specializations, while the 
(West) German system offered less than 20. Another way of looking at potential problems in this 
respect is to consider that there are "too many rocket scientists, too few marketing experts" 
(Nauro Campos and Aurelijus Dabušinskas, 2001). In other words, despite the high level of 
educational attainment of the average worker, the composition of the stock of human capital (in 
terms of the mix of occupations) has proven inadequate to the needs of a modern market 
economy.
24 
   Table 7 reveals a worrisome trend: secondary school gross enrollment ratios not only 
show considerable variation,
 but also in many countries have declined since 1990. In particular, 
                                                                 
24 Other studies on this topic are Klara Sabirianova (2000) and Nauro Campos and Dana Žlabkova (2001). 
These studies concur in that at least 30% of all employed workers changed occupation in the early years 
of the transition in as different countries as Estonia, Russia and Hungary. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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the range of these ratios fell by five percentage points in the first five years alone. This decline 
can also be seen using different data (on average years of schooling) from Barro and Lee (2001). 
Note, however, that only the ASIA group shows sustained decline. Although these figures 
remain high by international standards,
25 such a contraction is impressive.  
 
Table 7 
Gross School Enrollment Rates (Basic Education)  
Regional Averages: 1990-1998 
 
                   
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
                   
BALTIC  94.70  93.43  91.57  90.70  90.73  91.53  92.20  93.30  94.00 
BALKAN  90.65  89.20  86.95  87.53  87.82  88.24  89.60  93.95  94.60 
VISEGRAD  97.68  97.70  97.76  97.62  97.36  97.46  97.80  97.94  97.40 
ASIA  92.96  91.66  90.58  88.35  87.96  86.80  86.69  86.83  87.88 
BUR  92.80  91.93  91.53  90.87  90.83  91.13  90.90  90.73  91.53 
                   
CEEB  94.34  93.44  92.09  91.95  91.97  92.41  93.20  95.06  95.33 
CIS  92.88  91.80  91.05  89.61  89.40  88.97  88.79  88.78  89.71 
                   
Notes: Authors' calculations using UNICEF's MONEE data. See text for definition of regional 
groups.  
 
In summary, we think it is correct to say that during the transition process, labor moved. 
It did not move in the most obvious way, that is, geographically. Over space, labor mobility in 
transition economies remains extremely low because of, inter alia, distortions in the housing 
market (Tito Boeri and Christopher Flinn, 1999). Yet workers moved: (a) in large numbers from 
employed in 1988 to inactivity or unemployed at the end of the 1990s; (b) in large numbers from 
the state sector to the private sector (this is particularly true in the CEEB countries, see Boeri, 
2000); and (c) workers have changed occupation in unprecedented scale.  
                                                                 
25 The 1997 World Development Report reports that, in 1993, this ratio for middle-income economies was 
63, and 97 for high-income economies (Table 7, pp. 226-227).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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2.5 Trade re-oriented 
There are at least two good reasons for studying foreign trade when searching for the stylized 
facts of the transition. The first is to investigate whether or not the recessionary impact of 
transition affected foreign trade, and if so, whether the dynamics of trade exhibits a similar 
pattern. The proposition about the reverse link, that the collapse of CMEA deepened the output 
fall and that successful trade performance has helped to cope with the fall, reinforces the 
importance of trade dynamics in the process of transition (Peter Christoffersen and Peter Doyle, 
1998).
 A second reason arises from the expectation that market forces would change the trade 
patterns of transition countries by reorienting trade towards western markets.
26 After ten years of 
transition, one should ask whether foreign trade data indicate that such redirection has indeed 
taken place. In this section, our focus is on three foreign trade dimensions: trade volumes, trade 
patterns and openness (trade-to-GDP ratio).
27  
The data support the proposition that the level of foreign trade in transition countries has 
followed a decline and (partial) recovery pattern. Unweighted averages of export indexes 
indicate a very strong initial decline and partial recovery in foreign trade for both CEEB and CIS 
countries. CEEB exports declined by 62 per cent since the start of transition to reach its lowest 
point in 1993, and then rose up to 71 per cent of 1990 exports level in 1998. CIS exports reached 
their lowest level a year later, in 1994, but the drop in CIS trade was much more pronounced. 
Although the CIS exports did show clear signs of recovery since, exports declined again in 1998, 
this time due to the crisis in Russia. In 1998 CIS exports were about 30 per cent higher than in 
the trough year (1994) but represented only 15 per cent of 1990 exports. 
As for trade redirection, Table 8 shows that the share of industrial countries has increased 
dramatically in the exports of CEEB and CIS, as well as in all the subgroups of transition 
economies. The percentage of exports to industrial countries from the CEEB started out twice as 
high as this share from CIS countries and end up the period three times as high. The share of 
                                                                 
26 Robert Baldwin (1994), Paul Brenton and Daniel Gros (1997), Bartlomiej  Kaminski, Zhen Wang and 
Alan  Winters (1996)  and  Mathilde Maurel and Guillaume Cheikbossian (1997) discuss trade re-
orientation in transition. 
27 The trade data of the FSU countries (Baltic and CIS) are taken from Misha Belkindas and Olga Ivanova 
(1995) for 1990-1994 period and from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) for years 1994 -
1998. The inclusion of year 1994 in both series serves to evaluate using different data sources. For the 
non-FSU transition economies data are taken from the IMF DOTS. Trade volumes are measured in 
current US dollars. Trade data in constant US dollars as well as trade-to-GDP ratios are found in the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Visegrad trade to industrial countries has always been the highest, while the shares from the 
ASIA and BUR groups have been consistently the lowest (indeed almost a third of the Visegrad 
share throughout). Despite their relatively high initial shares, the adjustment was rapid: these 
export shares rise from about 55 per cent to more than 70 per cent for Vysegrad group, from 45 
to 55 per cent for the Balkan countries, and from roughly 15 to 25 per cent for BUR and Asia 
economies. Keeping in mind the collapse of the Soviet Union and its implications for inter-
industry trade, the speed of re-orientation of trade in the Baltics is remarkable. The percentage of 
Baltic exports to industrial countries grew from less then 5% in 1991 to more than 50% in 1998. 
This compares very favourably with increases in the shares of the ASIA and BUR groups from 
about 7% to about 24% and from about 14% (1992) to about 26%, respectively, over the same 
period. 
 
Table 8 
Trade Reorientation (Share of Exports to Industrial Countries) 
Regional Averages: 1990-1998 
 
                   
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
                   
BALTIC  6.25  3.70  41.73  42.97  42.52  49.52  46.56  56.82  55.42 
BALKAN  43.58  47.70  32.89  38.03  40.17  40.87  44.35  47.81  54.34 
VISEGRAD  54.13  64.07  69.46  67.08  68.47  68.78  68.10  69.68  72.96 
ASIA  8.40  6.87  17.50  22.44  26.50  23.93  21.53  19.59  23.12 
BUR  21.61  18.55  13.76  16.79  28.00  26.42  24.76  24.59  26.60 
                   
CEEB  34.65  38.49  48.03  49.36  50.38  53.06  53.00  58.10  60.91 
CIS  15.00  12.71  15.63  19.61  27.25  25.17  23.15  22.09  24.86 
                 
Notes: Authors' calculations using IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (various issues) data. See 
text for definition of regional groups. 
 
What dynamics would one expect for openness in transition economies? It was often 
claimed that central planning created excessively integrated economies and, if this assessment is 
correct, the collapse of CMEA would lead to somewhat less open economies. A closer look at 
the evolution of openness brings up two observations. First, there was a relatively turbulent 
period characterized by a strong decline of the ratio in the case of CIS in 1991, and a sharp rise 
in openness for both CEEB and CIS in 1992. Second, the trade-to-GDP ratio was relatively William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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stable over 1992-1997, although slowly but steadily declining in the case of CIS. In 1997, both 
CEEB and CIS countries are not less but rather more o pen economies than at the start of 
transition.  This is clearly so for Balkan, Vysegrad and Baltic countries whose openness (trade to 
GDP ratio) increased by 40 and 30 per cent respectively. BUR and Asia countries seem to have 
the same trade-to-GDP ratios as at the beginning of transition. An alternative but often preferred 
openness measure, trade-to-GDP (PPP) ratio reveals a similar trend: these economies are 
gradually becoming more open. At a less aggregated level the same tendency has prevailed: the 
openness of transition economies has increased continuously
28.  
In sum, the performance of foreign trade in transition economies suggests the following 
developments, which seem to be general enough to qualify for one more stylized fact of 
transition. There was a common decline and partial recovery pattern in the dynamics of foreign 
trade. Trade patterns have changed in that the share of industrial economies as destination rose 
significantly. The collapse of the CMEA was the major reason for the changing trade patterns in 
the initial stage of transition, while better export performance in western markets vis-à-vis 
eastern ones seems to dominate later. The data suggest that there has been no tendency for 
transition economies to become less open, and in 1999 they were relatively more open than 
under central planning. 
 
 
2.6 Structure changed 
Although one definition of the transition process is the structural change consisting in the 
reallocation of resources on the basis of market incentives, it is useful to analyze the structural 
change that actually occurred in transition economies and compare it with predictions from the 
experience of developing countries. This may help to emphasize how much of the structural 
change reflects a movement toward an economic structure consistent with relative prices. 
                                                                 
28 Oleh Havrylyshyn and Hassan Al-Atrash (1998) used a cross-section regression analysis to answer the 
question of how trade-to-GDP (PPP) ratios of transition economies in 1995 compared to those of “more 
established market economies.” Their conclusion was that (with some puzzling exceptions) transition 
economies were as open as the “benchmark” economies. One might note, however, that this trade-to-GDP 
(PPP) has not been stable and mostly moved upwards since 1995 (except for Asia), implying that 
transition economies became even more open.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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According to the Chenery hypothesis (Hollis Chenery, 1960),
29 as real per capita GDP 
grows, the structure of output changes in that the share of agriculture declines, while that of 
services increases. The socialist economy had a structure of output that favoured industry and 
repressed services, as the latter were considered, in Marxist terminology, “unproductive.” One 
should then expect the structure of output to change rapidly in the first ten years of transition. 
That is precisely what one finds, but with important caveats both in terms of which sectors 
adjusted faster and in which group of countries (CEEB or CIS) that happened more prominently. 
  Not surprisingly, industry was the largest sector at the beginning of the transition. 
Comparing the shares of value added by industry in GDP between the CEEB and CIS countries, 
notice that in 1990 it was higher in the former than in the latter (around 47% and 42%, 
respectively), but it declined faster in the CEEB than in the CIS group. In 1998, the share of 
industry stands at around 32 % of GDP in the CEEB countries (compared to 34% in the CIS). 
The declines in the manufacturing shares are very much in line with these changes. Yet one 
observes the opposite regarding the share of services in GDP. These shares are basically identical 
in 1990 in the CIS and CEEB groups (approximately 35% of GDP), but they increase in the next 
six years at different speeds, reaching 55% of GDP in the CEEB countries in 1996 and 47% in 
the CIS countries. 
Although the changes in the share of agriculture pale in comparison, they are still 
interesting, in particular when contrasting the CEEB with the CIS experience. In the CIS 
countries, the share of agriculture in GDP declined from 27 to 20 percent between 1990 and 
1998. The discrepancies between simple averages and GDP per capita-weighted averages can be 
safely ignored for the CIS but not for the CEEB countries.
 For the latter, the unweighted average 
does not seem to change at all in those years and stands at 18% of GDP. Yet, when examining 
GDP per capita-weighted averages, this share declines from 15% of GDP in 1990 to a mere 9% 
in 1996. One finds the reason for this discrepancy in the Balkan countries, for which the simple 
average increases in 1990-1998 while the weighted average decreases, although in both cases the 
share of agriculture is still twice as high for the remaining (non Balkan) CEEB countries.
                                                                 
29 Moses Syrquin (1988) surveys this large literature and Roland Döhrn and Ullrich Heilemann (1996) 
present a test of the hypothesis for early transition.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Table 9 
Structural Change (Value Added in Industry as Percentage of GDP)   
Regional Averages: 1990-1998 
 
                   
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
                   
BALTIC  48.89  44.93  37.48  36.06  32.65  32.28  31.07  31.13  29.57 
BALKANS  45.41  39.37  34.89  35.56  36.13  31.66  31.19  30.71  30.38 
VISEGRAD  47.79  46.01  39.32  37.72  35.51  36.17  35.07  35.49  35.35 
BUR  46.72  48.11  46.65  39.70  42.26  39.67  38.18  37.88  38.58 
ASIA  36.36  37.40  36.30  37.04  31.93  31.87  30.56  28.30  29.93 
                   
CEEB  47.36  43.44  37.23  36.45  34.76  33.37  32.44  32.44  31.77 
CIS  41.54  42.75  41.48  38.37  37.09  35.77  34.37  33.09  34.26 
                   
Notes: Authors' calculations using 2000 World Development Indicators data. See text for 
definition of regional groups.  
 
  How deep is this process of structural change in international perspective? To answer this 
question first recall that most of the CIS countries end this period as low income or middle-lower 
income, while the majority of the CEEB countries in the late 1990s are classified as upper-
middle income economies. The declines in the share of agriculture in GDP between 1990 and 
1998 in the CIS countries are very much in line with those between 1980 and 1998 for low 
income or middle-lower income economies.
30 The same can be said for the behaviour of this 
share in the CEEB countries vis-à-vis its change between 1980 and 1998 in the upper-middle 
income economies. Therefore, the sources of dynamism are to be found in the increases in the 
shares of services and in the declines in the shares of industry. 
The rate of decline of the shares of industry in GDP is more than twice as high in the 
CEEB countries than for the upper-middle income group. A similar statement is true with respect 
to those shares in CIS countries vis-à-vis the changes observed in low income or middle-lower 
income countries. Regarding services, note that the rate of increase in the share of services in 
GDP is more than twice as high in the CEEB countries than for the upper-middle income group. 
                                                                 
30 World Bank,  1999/2000  World Development Report (Table 12, p. 252-253) provides population 
weighted averages for these shares in upper-middle, low and middle-lower income countries. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Yet, the rate of increase of the shares of services in GDP in the CIS countries are not noticeably 
different from this rate of increase in low income or middle-lower income countries.
 31 
On this basis, we claim that during the transition the structure changed. The sectoral 
composition of GDP changed rather fast. In the CEEB countries we observe the share of services 
in GDP growing rapidly, while the share of industry is similarly shrinking. On the other hand, in 
the CIS countries structural change take place in a slightly different manner. It is driven by a 
more modest growth in the share of services, and more modest declines (vis-à-vis those in the 
CEEB countries) in the shares of agriculture and industry. The process of structural change in the 
CEEB countries is impressive even when compared to similar changes in countries at the same 
levels of development. On the other hand, the process of structural change in the CIS countries is 
not impressive in international perspective, as similar changes can be observed in low income 
and middle-lower income countries. 
 
 
2.7 Institutions collapsed   
As the transition experience has accumulated, it has become clearer that the “persistent disparity 
between progress in liberalization and privatization, on the one hand, and in the development of 
institutions that support markets and private enterprise (…), on the other” (EBRD, 1999, p. 26) is 
directly related to  overall economic performance. Countries where this disparity decreased 
during the transition performed better than countries where this disparity was allowed to persist, 
or even to increase. A major impediment to assess the role of institutions in explaining economic 
performance during the transition refers to the difficulties in identifying theoretically-sound 
measures of those institutions that are relevant for growth. This constraint is particularly severe: 
it demands a systematic panel data set of institutional indicators instead of the incomplete and 
mostly cross-sectional data available so far. A first and very preliminary attempt to circumvent 
this problem is offered by Campos (2000). The author uses the concept of “governance,” as 
developed by the World Bank (1994), to put forward a set of four indicators for different 
institutional dimensions of “governance,” for 25 transition countries, during the period 1989 and 
1998.   
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Let us examine the “rule of law” indicator. Notice first that there are two important issues 
in constructing the indicator. One relates to the aggregation of different underlying components, 
and the other to the choice of the underlying components. As for the aggregation, a simple 
procedure was adopted: the series was re-coded over an identical 1 to 10 scale (re-based first if 
needed) and then aggregated by simple averaging. As for the underlying components, the 
indicator for “the rule of law” was constructed on the basis of three indicators, the first two 
focusing on enforcement and the latter on the type and substance of the “law” itself. The first is 
an ICRG indicator (“rule of law tradition”) reflecting the country-specific degree to which 
citizens are willing to accept the established institutions for making and implementing laws and 
resolving disputes. Higher scores of “rule of law” indicate that the country has sound political 
institutions and a strong court system. The second indicator, property rights, is “factor #8” from 
Kim Holmes, Bryan Johnson and Melanie Kirkpatrick (1997, 1998). It measures, on a 1-5 scale, 
the government influence over the judicial system, the commercial code defining contracts, the 
sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes, corruption within the judiciary system, 
delays in judicial decisions, and the extent of legally granted and protected private property. The 
third indicator upon which this measure is based is “rule of law” from Adrian Karatnycky, 
Alexander Motyl and Boris Shor (1998) which measures on a 1 to 7 scale whether a post-
communist constitution has been adopted, whether it does provide for property and human rights, 
whether the criminal code has been subject to reform, whether judges rule fairly and impartially 
and whether they were appointed during the communist era, whether the courts are free of 
political control, whether the state provide public defenders, and whether ethnic minority rights 
are protected. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Table 10 
Government Expenditures as Percentage of GDP 
Regional Averages: 1990-1999 
 
                     
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                     
BALTIC  49.10  38.70  31.53  36.87  39.57  39.90  38.03  37.63  40.50  43.00 
BALKAN  55.57  42.73  45.08  39.48  39.78  38.33  37.52  36.23  36.18  37.62 
VISEGRAD  47.63  49.10  50.40  49.00  48.02  46.30  45.62  45.82  44.30  43.90 
ASIA  39.85  37.81  42.77  45.35  34.73  25.81  23.60  24.50  25.60  25.83 
BUR  n.a.  n.a.  58.53  51.80  47.93  38.17  42.47  44.00  41.73  40.33 
                     
CEEB  50.77  43.51  42.34  41.78  42.46  41.51  40.39  39.90  40.33  41.51 
CIS  n.a.  n.a.  50.65  48.58  41.33  31.99  33.03  34.25  33.67  33.08 
                     
Notes: Authors' calculations using 2000 World Development Indicators data. See text for 
definition of regional groups. n.a. indicates data not available. 
 
  Table 10 shows the regional averages for the "rule of law" indicator between 1989 and 
1998. It is clear from these data that the process of institutional build-up took off much faster in 
the Central and Eastern European countries, despite starting at a much higher level. It should be 
also noted that among the CIS countries, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia are characterized by an 
extremely slow process of deepening of a rule of law tradition.
32 There is also considerable 
heterogeneity among CEEB countries; on the one hand we can see a consistent process of 
institutional deepening in the Visegrad and Baltic countries, while very little of it is observed in 
the Balkan group. 
Institutional choices are also related to the size of the government, often measured in the 
literature as the share of government consumption in GDP. The study of the effects o f 
government size on economic growth is highly controversial, to say the least, and consensus is 
being built upon the notion that different types of expenditures have different effects on 
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economic growth.
33 Table 11 shows the evolution of government consumption in transition 
economies between 1990 and 1996. There seems to be no clear trends across those groups with 
one exception, namely that in the Baltic countries government consumption as a share of GDP is 
increasing throughout the period. It should also b e noted that these levels of government 
consumption are high in comparative perspective (except for the ASIA countries). In 1998, 
government consumption in low-income economies averaged 12 percent of GDP, in lower-
middle income countries it averaged 14 percent, in upper-middle income countries 11 percent, 
and in high-income countries it averaged 17 percent of GDP.
34 
 
Table 11 
Rule of law  
Regional Averages: 1990-1999 
 
                     
  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
                     
BALKANS  3.611  4.389  4.250  4.111  5.333  5.889  6.167  6.389  6.500  6.500 
VISEGRAD  6.800  7.933  8.133  8.133  8.633  8.800  9.233  9.633  9.833  9.833 
BALTIC  4.667  5.667  7.789  8.333  8.333  8.333  9.111  9.433  9.500  9.500 
BUR  4.000  5.000  5.289  5.056  5.056  5.056  5.056  5.056  5.056  5.056 
ASIA  2.250  2.375  2.271  2.937  3.896  3.896  4.417  4.913  5.625  5.625 
                     
CEEB  5.026  5.996  6.724  6.859  7.433  7.674  8.170  8.485  8.611  8.611 
CIS  3.125  3.688  3.780  3.997  4.476  4.476  4.736  4.984  5.340  5.340 
Note: Author’s calculations based on data from Campos (2000). See text for definition of 
regional groups.  
 
  In summary, the transition started off with the implosion of a tight political-economic 
system. Its collapse entails the fading of an institutional framework that persevered despite all its 
well-known problems. This generated an institutional vacuum. The data used in this section 
serves to show the painful, and in many cases slow, effort to build-up institutions that could 
support a modern market economy. 
                                                                 
33 See William Easterly and Sergio Rebelo (1993), Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti (1996), 
Shantayanan Devarajan, Vinaya Swaroop and Heng-fu Zou (1996), Stephen Miller and Frank Russek 
(1997), John Baffes and Anwar Shah (1998), and references therein. Analyses focusing on transition 
economies include Ke-young Chu and Gerd Schwartz (1994), Kornai (1995), Coricelli (1997) and  Marek 
Dabrowski (1997). 
34 Source is World Bank, 1997 World Development Report, Table 13, pp. 238-239. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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2.8 Transition costs  
The objective of this sub-section is to briefly discuss the extent to which output performance in 
transition has been associated with other measures of well-being such as poverty and inequality, 
longevity and morbidity, and literacy. One of the stylized facts of the transition so far is that the 
output fall has been associated with substantial costs in terms of rapidly rising poverty and 
inequality, as well as the sharp deterioration of various social indicators (notably, life expectancy 
and enrollment rates).
35 Three important issues to keep in mind are: first, that the starting (i.e., 
1989) levels were high vis-à-vis countries at similar levels of development. One of the most 
trumpeted successes of the pre-1989 regimes was the delivery of health, education and income 
equality. Second, that the drastic fall in output was not accompanied by equally drastic falls in 
consumption levels. In other words, consumption fell less than output, so that the welfare costs 
of the early years of the transition were smaller than those associated with the slowdown in 
economic activity. Third, here, the divide between Central and Eastern European and Former 
Soviet Union countries is seen very clearly.  For instance, mortality rates rose faster and were 
higher throughout in the latter group of countries (Brainerd, 2001). 
Arguably the first dimension over which this heavy social burden was identified regarded 
the rapid changes in mortality rates, prompting the World Bank’s 1996 World Development 
Report to raise the question “Is transition a killer?” The early years of the transition witnessed a 
rapid increase in mortality rates, and a major explanatory factor for these is the increase in adult 
male mortality rates. The effect of transition seems to be straightforward. The rising mortality 
rate of adult males is explained in large part by the psychological stress associated with turbulent 
times, with rising unemployment, poverty, and alcohol consumption (Elizabeth Brainerd, Ichiro 
Kawachi and Bruce Kennedy, 1998). Further, the much smaller increases in adult male mortality 
rates observed in the Caucasus and Central Asian economies (vis-à-vis all other former Soviet 
Union countries) seems closely related to the preponderance of family and other informal 
arrangement in cushioning those effects of the transition (“social capital”). Note that increases 
similar to the ones in the Caucasus and Central Asia did not occur outside of the former Soviet 
Union countries. Among transition economies, public health expenditures (as percent of GDP) 
                                                                 
35 See Elizabeth Brainerd (1998), Judith Shapiro (1995), John Flemming and John Micklewright (1999), 
EBRD Transition Report (1999), UNDP (1998), and UNICEF (1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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show an increasing trend until 1994,
36 when they started to decline, returning to their 1990 level 
(the exception is the Asia group, where health expenditures decrease from the start). However, 
the increase in health expenditures did not hamper the overall decline of life expectancy at birth 
until 1993. As expected, the largest decline was for the FSU countries not for the CEEB.  
 
Table 12 
Life Expectancy at Birth for Males (in years)  
Regional Averages: 1990-1999 
 
                     
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                     
BALTIC  65.13  64.50  63.90  62.43  61.53  62.03  64.26  64.86  65.00  n.a. 
BALKANS  67.89  67.81  67.33  66.57  66.90  66.79  67.06  67.12  67.30  67.19 
VISEGRAD  67.04  67.12  67.38  67.80  67.94  68.31  68.84  69.06  69.09  70.84 
ASIA  65.99  65.50  65.70  62.86  63.78  64.14  64.40  65.22  65.53  n.a. 
BUR  65.23  64.33  63.63  61.90  61.20  60.99  61.54  61.90  61.97  n.a. 
                     
CEEB  66.69  66.48  66.20  65.60  65.46  65.71  66.72  67.01  67.13  69.02 
CIS  65.61  64.92  64.67  62.38  62.49  62.57  62.97  63.56  63.75  n.a. 
                     
Notes: Authors' calculations using 2000 World Development Indicators data. See text for 
definition of regional groups. n.a. indicates data not available. 
 
Similar developments are observed with regard to changes in education indicators. For 
instance, the literacy  rate declined in all the countries for which data are available.
  37 We 
commented above on the changes on secondary school enrollment rates, similar developments 
can be seen with respect to primary school enrollment. The CEEB-FSU differences in this case is 
reinforced by the fact that enrolment declined faster in the least urbanized countries, which 
happened to be FSU countries. Interestingly, there seem to be no common pattern regarding 
public spending on education. 
As for poverty and inequality, the emerging consensus is that they have both increased 
sharply in the beginning of the transition and have, so far, not shown signs of declining. For 
example, the poverty headcount index (percentage of the population whose income is below the 
                                                                 
36 The same trend is seen for the division into CEEB and FSU groups, with FSU starting the decline from 
1993. As expected, total number of hospital beds and physicians per capita were also declining in these 
first ten years.   
37 The data cover only 12 countries for the years 1990, 1995 and 1997. See UNICEF (1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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poverty line) was around 4 percent in the late 1980s increasing to 45% in 1993-95 (Branko 
Milanovic, 1998, esp. Table 5.1).
 Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has 
also increased. Because of transition itself (price liberalization and privatization fuelling higher 
wages in the private sector), one could argue that is normal for inequality to increase. Yet, it is 
important to note that inequality increased faster and more decisively among former Soviet 
Union countries.  
In sum, the relationship between economic growth and various measures of well-being 
during the transition is marked by the rapid appearance of substantial social costs. Although 
inequality was expected to rise, there were few reasons to expect health and education conditions 
to deteriorate the way they did. 
 
 
2.9 The Magnificent Seven: Summary of the Stylised Facts of the Transition 
Table 13 summarizes what we consider to be the seven main stylized facts of the transition so 
far. Based on our previous analysis we believe that the following should stand as a robust set 
even in the face of (needed) future revisions and refinements in the underlying data. We think 
that there is enough evidence to argue that, in this first ten years, output fell, labor moved, the 
stock of physical capital shrank, there was a rapid and intense re-orientation of international 
trade towards the West, the structure of the economy changed, there was rapid collapse of 
institutional structures followed by a vacuum in many countries, and the transition involved large 
social costs principally in terms of worsening income inequality, mortality and poverty rates. The 
next section presents an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature in the light of this set 
of stylized facts.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Table 13. 
The Magnificent Seven: 
Stylized Facts of Ten Years of Transition 
 
 
Stylized fact 
 
Comments 
 
(1) Output Fell  Output fell in all countries of the former eastern Bloc, 
in stark contrast with development in China and 
Vietnam (where growth has been fast and sustained). 
The exact magnitude of the fall is a matter of 
controversy, inter alia, because of the sizeable informal 
sectors that quickly emerged. 
 
(2) Capital Shrank  Capital stocks reduced dramatically during the 
transition, although the expectation is that efficiency 
has increased. 
 
(3) Labor Moved  Labor moved in all senses, but the most obvious one: 
measures of geographical mobility are very low. Yet, 
we observe large changes in labour markets status, 
sectors, and occupations. 
 
(4) Trade Reoriented  CMEA trade collapsed and was re-directed to industrial 
countries in a very short period of time, with few 
exceptions (the slow re-orientation in BUR is led by 
Ukraine and Belarus, not Russia). 
 
(5) The Structure Changed  The share of value added by industry in GDP declined 
rapidly. In the CEEB case, this is due almost 
exclusively to the increase of the services share. In the 
case of CIS, the reasons for the slower decline are 
much less clear-cut. 
  
(6) Institutions Collapsed  The fall of communism created an enormous 
institutional vacuum. Although efforts to understand 
and measure it are just starting now, its effects are 
sizeable and omnipresent.   
 
(7) Transition Costs  One of the surprises of the transition was the 
appearance of unexpected costs. The rise of 
unemployment and income inequality was expected. 
The rise in mortality rates and the decline in school 
enrolment rates were not expected. 
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  Before proceeding, we should comment on the important issue of economic reform in the 
transition process. As we mentioned earlier, the debate in this  literature is whether initial 
conditions or economic reform policies have played the crucial role during the transition process 
so far. One problem in gauging the role of policies is the difficulty in obtaining reliable 
measures. The available ones are not detailed enough and more often than not are based on 
Western experts' judgement, when they need not be.
38 With these caveats in mind, Table 14 
shows a measure of economic reform that is widely used in this literature, namely De Melo, 
Cevdet, Gelb and Tenev (1997) "cumulative liberalization index". Higher values indicate a more 
intense, deeper and wider reform effort. The data show that reform has progressed much faster in 
Central and Eastern European than in the former Soviet Union countries. It is surprising to learn 
that we can not distinguish the ASIA from the BUR countries. Also of interest is that the reform 
effort in the BALKAN countries has been much more modest than in the Visegrad countries as 
well as in the Baltic economies. Despite these interesting insights, we believe better data is 
needed before attempting further analysis.  
 
Table 14 
Cumulative index of internal economic liberalization,  
Regional Averages: 1989-1998. 
 
                     
  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
                     
BALKANS  0.28  0.54  0.97  1.57  2.24  2.93  3.66  4.38  5.14  5.91 
VISEGRAD  0.42  0.85  1.60  2.42  3.26  4.12  5.01  5.90  6.80  7.71 
BALTICS  0.05  0.20  0.52  1.08  1.84  2.70  3.57  4.46  5.36  6.26 
BUR  0.04  0.08  0.18  0.49  0.84  1.26  1.82  2.40  2.95  3.49 
ASIA  0.04  0.08  0.17  0.45  0.80  1.20  1.71  2.27  2.86  3.46 
                     
CEEB  0.25  0.53  1.03  1.69  2.45  3.25  4.08  4.91  5.77  6.62 
CIS  0.04  0.08  0.18  0.47  0.82  1.23  1.76  2.33  2.91  3.48 
Notes: Authors' calculations using De Melo et al (DDGT, 1997) indexes. See text for definition 
of regional groups.  
 
The above seven facts apply to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union and thus should not be seen as stylized facts of transition in general.  
                                                                 
38  The point here is that for, say, “rule of law,” an expert's judgment is necessary, while for, say, “number 
of key prices liberalized in a certain year” we can clearly have a measure that is not necessarily based on 
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Indeed, the experience in Asia has been very different and a review of developments in transition 
economies cannot afford to exclude some of the fastest-growing countries. Economic 
performance in China and Vietnam during the 1990s is impressive and markedly contrasts with 
the performance of the European transition economies discussed above.
39  
A large body of research addresses these differences. Why have these Asian economies 
been so successful in conducting transition and the former Soviet bloc economies so 
unsuccessful? Initial conditions certainly play a role, not only because they provide for major 
differences between the two groups of countries. China, and the Asian economies in transition in 
general, did not embark in political and economic transitions simultaneously, have a relatively 
large share of agriculture in employment and in GDP, have much lower per capita incomes, and 
were relatively less integrated with CMEA. Institutions also account for an important difference: 
Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland and Chenggang Xu (1999) argue that because the Soviet-type 
economy was organized in specialized ministries while the Chinese-Type economy was 
organized on a regional basis, more latitude was allowed for experimentation and thus for 
gradualism. Chinese reform started with decentralisation in 1979 (Qian and Roland, 1998). Local 
governments were given significant autonomy and that has allowed needed experimentation with 
a number of reforms as well as the rapid entry of new firms (the TVEs, township and village 
enterprises, being a prime example). The new entrants generated an interesting paradox in that 
considerable competition emerged without privatisation and property rights well defined by law 
(McMillan, 1997). Using the space for experimentation meant that successful reforms were 
gradually introduced (on a national scale). Lawrence Lau, Qian and Roland (2000) discuss the 
advantages of the dual-track approach to price liberalisation. They note that liberalisation in 
China involved the government slowly phasing out planned prices and quantities. Balancing the 
plan and market-tracks did this, as agents could buy and sell at markets prices only once plan 
obligations were fulfilled. This process culminated with most prices being liberalised by the mid-
1990s (Qian, 2000).
40 The adoption of a reform strategy marked by gradualism and sequencing 
                                                                 
39 The performance of Mongolia is similar to that of the CIS countries. Like a former Soviet Union 
economy, it experienced a severe fall in output. Yet it had an earlier and sustained recovery. Growth rates 
are still modest compared to Laos, Vietnam and China (Sanjay Kalra and Torsten Slok, 1999). Average 
growth rates in Laos are higher than in Mongolia but significantly lower than in Vietnam. On China, see 
John McMillan and Barry Naughton (1992), Gregory Chow (1993), Naughton (1995), Loren Brandt and 
Xiaodong Zhu (2000) and Yingyi Qian (2000). For a revisionist perspective, see Alwyn Young (2000). 
On Vietnam, see Christina Dawkins and John Whalley (1996), James Riedel and Bruce Comer (1997) and 
Naughton (1996).  
40 The reform process in Vietnam is similarly characterized as gradualism, as opposed to the reform in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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concerns seems to be intrinsically linked to the much superior performance of China and 
Vietnam vis-à-vis the other transition economies.  
 
 
 
3.  Growth in Transition: The Theoretical Literature 
The theoretical literature on transition can usefully be divided in two groups, one 
focusing on the initial fall in output, the other on medium term issues.  The short time span that 
covers the experience of transition from a planned to a market economy makes it impossible for 
the analysis of economic g rowth to neglect the initial sharp, and largely unexpected, fall in 
output.  Moreover, in some instances the initial collapse translated into a persistent depression.  
Following the collapse of output, a lively debate started on its causes.  Several observers claimed 
that such a collapse could be simply explained as a Keynesian recession, driven by a fall in 
consumer demand (Blanchard, Rudiger Dornbusch, Paul Krugman, Richard Layard and 
Lawrence Summers, 1991, Andrew Berg and Jeffrey Sachs, 1992, David Lipton and Jeffrey 
Sachs, 1990, Roman Frydman, Stanislaw Wellisz and Grzegorz  Kolodko, 1991, among others). 
Other observers argued that the fall in output could not be described as a simple Keynesian 
recession, as the timing and the magnitude of the collapse suggested a different interpretation, 
based on the concept of “trade implosion”.
41  The phenomenon of “trade implosion” can be 
ascribed to the break-up of the old system of coordination of production and exchange, 
substituted with a system of decentralized  decisions and free market. The absence of 
fundamental market institutions implied that the old mechanisms of production and trade could 
not be quickly replaced by new well-functioning mechanisms. Kornai (1994), for instance, 
defined the output fall as a “transformational” recession, related to the overall transformation of 
the economic system. This view appears relevant for a longer run perspective, as it pointed out 
the risks of a prolonged period of recession, or low-output equilibrium. The “trade implosion” 
approach stresses the importance of institutional factors in affecting output performance in 
economies in transition.  Such institutional factors, as for instance institutions relating to 
financial markets, play a fundamental role in the growth literature as well. 
3.1  Explaining the Initial output collapse 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Laos and Mongolia.  
41 The term was first used in connection with the output collapse in economies in transition by Calvo and 
Coricelli (1993). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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The sharp and unexpected fall in output is a puzzle for economic theory.  First, liberalization of 
prices, dismantling of trade barriers and elimination of pervasive state intervention in economic 
activity, should have brought large efficiency gains.  Second, based on the experience of 
programs implemented in developing market economies, stabilization  per se should not have 
caused a sharp fall in output.  For instance, in Latin America and Israel stabilization programs 
relying on the exchange rate as an anchor to reduce inflation were not associated with significant 
output decline, at least in the initial phase of the programs (Miguel Kiguel and Nissan 
Liviatan,1989; Calvo and Vegh, 1993).  Moreover, in market economies, the output performance 
of stabilization programs relying on the exchange rate as an anchor differed sharply from that of 
countries that used monetary aggregates as an anchor.  By contrast, in transition economies 
output fell irrespective of the type of stabilization program implemented.  Therefore, the 
experience of transition economies cannot be easily explained with existing models used to 
analyze market economies.  In particular, for transition economies, supply-side explanations are 
likely to be more relevant than simple Keynesian models. 
Within the literature on the initial output collapse, two main contributions stand out.  One 
underlines the role of credit markets, the other the role of the so-called disorganization. 
 
 
3.2 Credit market imperfections 
In a planned economy, the artificial structure of production and trade imposed by the planning 
system made irrelevant credit markets, and to some extent money, at least in connection to the 
enterprise sector.  Dismantling of the planning system implied that production and trade were not 
only decentralized but they were carried out through monetary or credit arrangements.  
Development of credit markets requires time.  The availability of cash for transactions by 
enterprises was constrained by official credit, given that firms lacked financial savings that were 
illegal in most centrally planned economies (Garvy, 1972).  Calvo and Coricelli (1992, 1993) 
single out the credit market as one of the fundamental institutions missing in the former centrally 
planned economies.  The collapse of CMEA trade can also be seen as an example of trade 
implosion, related to the abandonment of an old mechanism of trade and netting out of payments, 
without the substitution with a private credit market.   
The i mposition of tight financial policies at the time of price liberalization likely 
determined a situation of credit crunch for enterprises.  The contraction of central bank credit William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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resulted in a contraction in overall credit to the economy, as private credit markets could not 
develop overnight.   
Liquidity shortage can in principle explain a temporary fall in output.  Over time, firms 
can accumulate monetary balances and converge to the optimal level of output that would have 
been reached in the presence of perfect credit markets.  Accordingly, the implied behavior of 
output would follow a U -shaped pattern.  An implication of this view is that output decline 
should be accompanied by a decline in productivity.  Moreover, real wages would drop as well, 
as enterprises attempt to generate liquidity to purchase inputs. 
The “credit crunch” approach has been extended to account for the possibility of longer 
term stagnation, a phenomenon observed in several transition countries, especially in the FSU.  
These extensions (Calvo and Coricelli, 1996; Dalia Marin and Monika Schnitzer, 1999; Clifford 
Gaddy and Barry Ickes, 1998) have shown how the initial credit crunch could lead to a “bad 
equilibrium”, with persistent low output.  The main channels of these bad equilibria are the 
explosion of inter-enterprise arrears and barter trade.  Generalized non payments and the 
widespread use of barter trade, while cautioning the effect of credit crunch at the enterprise level, 
may lead to inefficient macroeconomic equilibria. Both inter-enterprise arrears and barter are at 
the same time symptoms and causes of extremely high credit risk.  Barter trade eliminates credit 
risk by requiring exchange of goods as form of payment.  Inter-enterprise arrears reflect default 
in payments in transactions among enterprises.  Widespread use of these forms of payment 
technologies implies large costs in terms of loss in output and significant dynamic costs.  Indeed, 
entry of new firms is undermined by the presence of generalized default in payments and/or 
requirement of barter trade.  These phenomena can be thought as forms of dysfunctional 
institutions, reflecting an endemic lack of trust.  Lack of trust is likely to have large negative 
effects not only on the level of output, but also on growth rates (Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, 
2000).  Trust is an important element for the development of a new economic structure based on 
new networks of enterprises (John McMillan, Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann and Christopher 
Woodruff, 2000).  In a context in which trust is extremely low, existing industrial structures and 
systems of exchange tend to be perpetuated.  Given that in transition economies the initial 
industrial structure was highly inefficient, the difficulty in building new institutions constitutes 
an important obstacle for growth.  Understanding the phenomenon of generalized inter-enterprise 
arrears and their implications for output performance requires studying the interaction between 
macroeconomic and institutional variables, a topic discussed in the literature reviewed below.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Similar macroeconomic policies applied to countries with different levels of institutional 
development may lead to sharply different outcomes. The prediction of this approach is that 
countries starting reforms from a system closer to a rigid central plan were worse off than 
countries that had partly liberalized their economies, though in an incomplete and inefficient 
way. Despite their limitations, partial reforms may have contributed to building institutions 
fundamental for the functioning of a market economy, mainly in the area of financial markets. 
An indication of this is that inter-enterprise arrears and barter trade did not affect significantly 
more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, while they proved to be a  major 
obstacle for market reforms in the countries of the former Soviet Union.  For instance, in 
Hungary and Poland private credit markets in the form of trade credit developed soon after the 
start of reform programs (Calvo and Coricelli, 1996). 
 
 
3.3 Disorganization 
An alternative channel which shares some of the main elements of the above view is the so-
called phenomenon of disorganization (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997, BK from now on).  BK 
claim that disorganization was an important reason for output collapse especially in countries of 
the FSU.  Disorganization is defined as the break down of economic relations of the old regime, 
relations that cannot be replaced overnight by new ones. The main concept underlying this view 
is “specificity” in economic relations between firms. The period of central planning was one of 
extreme specificity, as firms were locked in relationships with a small number of firms, in many 
cases only one firm. Firms did not need to accumulate any information on other firms and in 
particular had no information on the ability and willingness to pay of their customers. A high 
degree of specificity implies the presence of monopoly rents.  Production chains link firms to 
several suppliers, depending on the degree of complexity of production. Higher complexity 
implies a larger number of inputs.  Under a decentralized system prices are set through a 
bargaining process. Customer firms, generally state enterprises at the start of reforms, make an 
offer price to their suppliers. If such a price is below the reservation price of the supplier (eg the 
outside option for the supplier), the latter does not provide inputs to the state firm and thus output 
falls. Assuming strong complementarities in production, even the lack of one input implies the 
impossibility to produce. The reason for inefficient bargaining is that the reservation price is 
private information of the supplier. An implication of he model is that the larger is the number of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
  44 
inputs, thus the higher is the degree of complexity of production, the larger will be the output 
fall. One could thus expect that the output fall would be more pronounced in highly 
industrialized economies. This may be a reason for the different performance in output of highly 
industrialized countries of the former Soviet Union with respect to mostly agrarian economies 
such as that of China (Roland, 2000). Another implication would be that output decline would be 
worse in countries that started reforms from a more rigid system of central planning.  In 
countries in which firms had already experienced decentralized mechanisms of bargaining, 
output decisions and even price setting, the adverse effects of inefficient bargaining would be 
less acute. 
A model of disorganization based on search frictions and investment specificity rather 
than inefficient bargaining is the one by Gérard Roland and Thierry Verdier (1997). In their 
model, production occurs through a matching process between firms. Efficient production is 
described as the occurrence of good matches, or matches between good firms. The exploitation 
of new good matches between customers and suppliers cannot occur instantaneously after 
liberalization. Search externalities and relation-specific investments produce a temporary output 
fall after liberalization. Relations existing during the previous regime break down, while new one 
emerge only gradually over time. Liberalization sets in new good opportunities. This triggers 
firms to search for good matches. However, there is a search externality, as the higher the 
number of firms searching is, the lower is the probability of finding a good match, as there are 
many bad firms searching as well.  Investment is relation specific, and it is carried out only when 
firms find good matches that tie firms over the log run. Therefore, during the search period 
investment contracts. Despite important differences in the models, Blanchard-Kremer and 
Roland-Verdier offer a similar explanation for the observed output collapse. The implications of 
their models are also similar.  Liberalization may produce a collapse in output if the necessary 
conditions for effectively replacing the old relations among firms are not in place. According to 
Roland (2000) a dual track liberalization approach, like the one followed in China, would solve 
the problem, by maintaining, for state firms, the old channels and relations. This would make 
production feasible, and at the same time allowing at the margin entry of new firms that will 
search for new opportunities. 
The disorganization view offers an interpretation of output collapse that is different but 
not in contrast with the credit crunch view.  Indeed, those views may be complementary.
42  
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An explicit attempt to merge the views of Calvo-Coricelli and Blanchard-Kremer has 
been carried out by Marin and Schnitzer (2000), who conclude that credit constraints may reduce 
the negative impact of disorganization. This conclusion is not fully convincing. As noted by 
Blanchard and Kremer the coordination problem in the enterprise sector is made worse by the 
lack of liquidity. The more complex is the production process, the more important is credit. 
Although it is conceivable that at the microeconomic level of bilateral bargaining between 
supplier and customer liquidity constraints may reduce the effects of disorganization by 
increasing the bargaining power of the customer, at an aggregate level the lack of credit is likely 
to produce large negative effects on output.   
As transition progressed and several countries of Central and Eastern Europe started to 
grow out of the initial collapse, a literature focusing on medium term perspective and on 
dynamic issues developed.  Structural change and the reallocation of resources across sectors and 
firms are at the core of this literature. 
 
 
3.4 Creative destruction and optimal speed of transition 
A popular view of transition describes output dynamics along a path determined by the sector 
reallocation of resources. As resources move out of the old state firms into the private sector, 
productivity increases. If there are adjustment costs, or other imperfections such as search costs, 
aggregate output is likely to drop initially and increase afterwards, when the private sector has 
reached a sufficient size. Accordingly, output follows a U-shaped path. The initial contraction in 
output is reminiscent of a phenomenon of Schumpeterian “creative destruction”. Inefficient firms 
weed out, leaving room for the expansion of new, more efficient firms. A clear signal of such 
Schumpeterian process would be the increase in productivity accompanying the initial decline in 
output (in stark contrast with the implications of models in section 3.2 and 3.3. above). Empirical 
evidence presented in Simon Commander and Fabrizio Coricelli (1995) emphasizes that in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
system would lead to output collapse due to a financial crisis. In the old regime of central planning the tax 
system relied on state enterprise taxation, while the banking system acted simply as a central clearing 
house.  Decentralization and liberalization implies that the state gives away control on its tax base and, 
simultaneously commercial banks face the problem of providing credit in a context in which they lack the 
information and the expertise to act efficiently. Past information on enterprises is irrelevant as the 
arbitrary system of taxes and transfers made profitability as a bad indicator of efficiency of firms. As a 
result, liberalization would imply a fiscal crisis accompanied by a crisis of a banking sector that would be 
exposed to large amounts of bad loans. The conclusions of McKinnon’s analysis are similar to those of 
Roland, and a gradual approach to reform is favored. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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initial phase there was little dynamics in terms of job flows, thus indicating that Schumpeterian 
forces were slow to operate. At first sight, it would appear optimal to make the process of 
transition as fast as possible, by shortening the initial period of decline in output.  However, if 
one takes into account possible adverse feedbacks, such as fiscal costs of the initial fall in output, 
or congestion effects in the labor market due to high unemployment, the normative implications 
of the models are less obvious. For these reasons a literature on the optimal speed of transition 
emerged.  
Perhaps, the most influential work in this area is Phillippe Aghion and Olivier Blanchard 
(1994). They develop a two sector search model, in which workers displaced from old state firms 
search for jobs in the new private sector. Job creation in the private sector is a function of profits, 
current and expected, which in turn depend on wages. The endogenous mechanism of job 
creation works through an efficiency wage model, in which the rate of unemployment, by 
reducing wages, stimulates the creation of jobs in the private sector. The shrinking of the state 
sector is considered a policy variable. Without macroeconomic feedbacks, the best policy would 
naturally be to shrink the state sector as fast as possible. However, job creation in the private 
sector depends on net profits, hence on tax rates paid by private firms. Given that the state pays 
for unemployment benefits out of its budget, the higher is unemployment, the higher would be 
the tax rate for private firms, not only because the needed public expenditure would be higher, 
but also because the tax revenue collected from state firms would be lower as the state sector 
shrinks. This adverse fiscal effect counteracts the potential positive effect of unemployment on 
job creation in the private sector. As a result, there is the risk that a too fast speed of transition, 
namely a too fast shrinking of the state sector, derails the transition process, leading to an 
equilibrium with persistent high unemployment. By dosing the contraction of the state sector the 
economy could achieve a successful shift of resources to the private sector, that ultimately will 
absorb all workers in the economy. Although relevant for a normative analysis of the speed of 
transition and for the role of unemployment, the model is less suited for an analysis of the growth 
process in transition economies. Indeed, the model implies a constant difference between 
productivity in state and private firms and, more important, it does not consider the role of 
investment, both in physical and human capital. In addition, the assumption of an exogenous 
decline of state firms appears a too strong assumption, that rules out the important interaction 
between the increase of new private firms and the endogenous shrinking of the state sector. 
We now turn to models that tackle directly dynamic issues and the investment process. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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3.5 Output dynamics and capital accumulation 
One of the main challenges of transition is the replacement of the old capital stock with a new 
one. The process of over-investment during central planning has left transition countries with an 
inherited stock of capital largely useless under condition of a market economy and international 
competition. Even human capital, often cited as a major strength of formerly centrally planned 
economy appears in many instances inadequate for a market economy. Thus, new investments in 
physical and human capital represent the main engine of growth in transition economies. 
Michael Castanheira and Gérard Roland (2000) develop a Ramsey-type model of optimal 
growth with two sectors, state and private and Leontieff type technologies. In the private sector 
firms are equally productive, while in the state sector firms are ordered by decreasing 
productivity. Moreover, even the most productive state-owned firm is less productive than a 
private firm. In contrast with other models of transition, in particular Aghion and Blanchard 
(1994), there are no frictions in the labor market. A consequence of the assumed technology is 
that return to capital is always higher in the private sector. As a result, all investment takes place 
in private firms, and the reallocation of labor across sectors is driven by capital accumulation in 
the new private sector. In turn, investment is determined by optimal savings, which summarizes 
the speed of transition, defined as the speed of reallocation of labor from state to private firms. 
The higher return to capital in private firms can be captured only after capital has been installed. 
With Leontieff technology, labor does not jump instantaneously from state to private firms, and 
thus transition is a gradual process.  The state sector continuously shrinks. The optimal transition 
path, defined in terms of the length of transition, depends on the parameters of utility function, 
on the discount rate, on the technology in state firms and on the capital labor ratio. Along the 
optimal path growth rates decline as the productivity gains from a shift of resources from state to 
private firms narrow.  It is indeed optimal to close the less productive state firms first. An 
implication of the optimal path is that growth rates decline over time during transition, but output 
grows continuously. Therefore, the optimal path is inconsistent with the observed initial fall in 
output.  
Having determined the optimal path, hence the optimal speed of transition, one can 
analyze the effects of deviations from such a path.  In particular, one can analyze the effects of 
going too fast, by closing state firms at a rate that is initially faster than the one obtained along 
the optimal path, or of going too slow. It turns out that going slower has no effect on the speed of 
transition, as the private sector pulls out workers from state firms irrespective of the attempt of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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the government to initially close firms below the optimal rate. By contrast, a too fast rate of 
closing affects the speed of transition, growth and welfare. Interestingly, a faster rate of closure 
of the state sector may lengthen the transition process and it reduces welfare. This is due to an 
income effect associated with the decline in output of state firms. From a descriptive point of 
view it should be noted that the growth rate increases at initial stages of transition with a faster 
closure of state firms. Thus, the empirical implication of the model for the analysis of growth is 
that countries that followed a bolder approach to closure of state enterprises should display faster 
rates of growth initially.  
The model by C-R has the advantage of using a framework as close as possible to the 
standard Ramsey model of optimal growth.  However, neglect of important deviations from the 
general equilibrium model with perfect markets may reduce the empirical relevance of the 
model. For instance, the assumption that the new private sector pulls out workers from the state 
sector starting from the less efficient firms may hide the possible important migration out of the 
state sector of the most productive workers. This migration is likely to reduce the overall 
productivity of firms in the state sector, a phenomenon that could be captured in models with 
efficiency wages and heterogeneous labor force. Similarly, with credit market imperfections a 
squeeze on state firms is likely to penalize all firms, irrespective of their level of productive 
efficiency, a point made in the literature reviewed in the preceding section.  In sum, while very 
valuable as a framework to discuss the optimal speed of transition, the model does not capture 
the U-shaped path of output that characterized the transition process.   
  Models that attempt to combine the mechanisms highlighted by A-B and the investment 
process analyzed by C -R have been developed by Bankhim Chadha and Fabrizio Coricelli 
(1995). Chadha and Coricelli (C-C from now on) develop a two-sector model that incorporates 
dynamics of physical capital. The model shares with Aghion and Blanchard the basic structure of 
the labor market. However, it assumes flexibility in labor markets and imperfections in credit 
markets.  The underlying assumption is that financial sector imperfections should be a more 
relevant constraint on growth in transition economies than labor market imperfections. In C-C 
investment in the private sector is subject to adjustment costs. The main analytical contribution 
of this paper is that investment becomes a function of the rate of unemployment, a function 
which is highly nonlinear (a similar channel works in Ricardo Caballero and Mohamad 
Hammour, 1996).  It turns out that there is a minimal rate of unemployment required to push the 
economy towards a successful transition path, a path along which labor shifts continuously from William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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the state to the private sector.  In the model, the contraction of the state sector is endogenous and 
is determined by the growth of the private sector. Thus, one could speak of a process of “creative 
destruction”. The government can affect such a process by tightening the constraints on state 
firms, namely by reducing subsidies.
43 However, a successful transition may require a 
sufficiently developed safety net for the unemployed. Both the ability to tighten constraints and 
impose discipline on state firms and the presence of a safety net depend on institutional 
development, in terms of an efficient judicial system and administration. The model predicts that 
growth rates should be positively associated with unemployment, up to a critical point after 
which the expansion of the private sector is capable of absorbing workers leaving the state 
sector.  Another prediction is that, other things equal, countries with poor safety nets and poor 
systems for enforcing discipline in the enterprise sector would show poor growth performance. 
Chadha, Coricelli and Kornelia Krajnyak  (1993) examine the issue of productivity 
growth during transition and its connection with the dynamics of the state and private sectors. It 
is assumed that private firms offer greater scope for productivity growth, associated with 
accumulation of skills. As in Robert Lucas (1988), the accumulation of skills in the private sector 
depends on the number of workers employed in the private sector. This endogenous mechanism 
opens the possibility for multiple equilibrium path. If employment in the private sector does not 
reach a critical value, transition may derail, with the economy stuck at a low output equilibrium 
dominated by state firms.  As in Chadha and Coricelli (1996), unemployment exerts a positive 
effect on job creation in the private sector and consequently on the process of productivity 
growth lead by accumulation of human capital. 
  The models by Chadha, Coricelli and Krajnyak (1993) and Chadha and Coricelli (1995, 
1997) share some of the main conclusions reached by A-B and C-R. Their focus is more on the 
descriptive than on the normative aspects of transition, and some of their conclusions may serve 
as a useful reference point for empirical analysis. First, to understand aggregate dynamics is 
crucial to analyze the asymmetric dynamics of state and private firms. Second, capital market 
imperfections are likely to be a major impediment to growth. Third, total factor productivity 
would play a key role as a determinant of aggregate growth only at later stages of transition. 
Indeed, productivity gains in the new private sector need time to be captured, as they result from 
the process of accumulation of human capital. Thus, transition is a lengthy and costly process. 
                                                                 
43  Chadha and Coricelli (1997) also discuss this point. The concept of subsidies in transition economies 
should be interpreted in a broad sense, including for instance interest rate subsidies, tax exemptions and 
tax arrears. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Several macroeconomic indicators are bound to worsen along a successful transition path. If 
countries face stringent macroeconomic constraints, on the fiscal and external side, they may be 
induced to slow down transition, with significant medium term output losses. Incentives to move 
out of state firms are important. Adequate social safety nets permit workers to abandon outdated 
state firms. In this area, the experience of Central-Eastern European countries has been sharply 
different from that of the former Soviet Union (Boeri, 2000). The presence of safety nets in 
CEEs allowed a significant contraction of employment in state firms, whereas in the former 
Soviet Union workers remained attached for several years after reforms to state firms because of 
the lack of any outside option in the form of unemployment benefits. 
In addition to the availability of fiscal resources during transition, factors improving the 
functioning of financial markets and institutions favoring the development of new private firms 
should prove fundamental factors determining the growth performance of transition economies.
44   
  An important implication of the two brands of literature reviewed in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 
3.4, is that price liberalization and tight macroeconomic policies do not necessarily foster 
growth.  Institutions enabling the functioning of a market economy are a fundamental 
precondition for growth.  Particularly important are institutions that relate to financial markets.  
Equally important are institutions such as adequate social safety net.  
 
 
 
3.6  Institutions and growth  
In recent years, the literature on growth has paid increasing attention to the role of institutions in 
affecting growth rates (Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, 2001, Dani 
Rodrik, 2000, David Romer, 2000). Transition economies are a unique laboratory for these 
views. Indeed, central planning was an institutional arrangement that has proven highly 
inefficient, as shown by the dynamics of total factor productivity (Tables 1 and 2). Mathias 
Dewatripont and Gérard Roland (1997) effectively define transition as a large scale institutional 
change. 
                                                                 
44 Calvo and Jacob Frenkel (1991) introduce credit market imperfections in a growth model.  Lack of 
information on enterprise creditworthiness, untested in the previous regime creates a situation in which 
profitable investments are not undertaken.  Inefficient financial markets produce a shortening of the 
horizon of firms, with negative effects on long term growth. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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The notion of institutions is too vague to lead to a simple theoretical treatment.
45 
Although the theories are still sketchy, several channels have been identified, all of them 
contributing to what is called social infrastructure, or social capital. Romer (2000) divides the 
studies on the determinants of social infrastructure in three groups. One focuses on  incentives, 
and underlines the preference for dictators to build and maintain social infrastructure conducive 
to low average incomes. The second concerns the broad issue of cultural factors, encompassing 
religion, ethnic diversity, family structure and civic participation. The idea is that ethnic 
homogeneity, common religion and culture, in addition to civic participation increase social 
cohesion and trust. The latter seems to be crucial for the development of efficient financial 
markets. Finally, it has been identified an even more elusive concept of determinant of social 
infrastructure, namely individuals’ beliefs about the right policies and institutions. Different 
individuals’ beliefs imply different choices of institutions by governments. 
All these three channels seem important for transition economies. Out of a common shift 
towards a more democratic society and a more liberalized economy, countries in transition have 
displayed a wide range of institutional arrangements and, for all of them, the process  of 
institutional building takes a long time.  A general problem encountered by transition economies 
has been the assumption of the existence of a blueprint of efficient institutions and the attempt to 
adopt it. The debate between gradualism and shock therapy is a case in point (Lipton and Sachs, 
1990, Fischer and Gelb, 1991). The defenders of shock therapy neglected the importance of 
search and evolution of the right institutions for the different reality of each country (Rodrik, 
2000). Furthermore, emphasis on the role of institutions implies a more complex view of the 
relationship between the state and the market. Indeed, the state plays a fundamental role in 
building institutions for the functioning of markets. Mario Nuti and Richard Portes (1993) point 
out the phenomenon of “state desertion” as a major drawback of reforms in transition economies. 
The collapse of the state apparatus might have been one of the main obstacles for the 
development of a well-functioning market economy.
46  Therefore, the issue of the role of the 
state in connection with the development of social capital is a key area for research. 
                                                                 
45 A growing literature is analyzing the role of institutions and of complementarity in institutions and 
institutional reform. See among others Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990), Ugo Pagano (1993) and 
Masahiko Aoki (2001). This literature points to interesting directions for research on transition countries 
as well.  However, it goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
46 Boeri (2000) notes that employment in the state sector (excluding state enterprises) increased during the 
transition period in the more successful countries of Central-Eastern Europe, while it fell in the less 
successful countries of the former Soviet Union. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Furthermore, the role of social safety nets as a fundamental factor for generating social 
cohesion and support for market reforms cannot be underestimated. An additional important 
aspect in the analysis of institutions is the accession to European Union for several countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, in this case institutional change is by and large constrained 
to occur within the blueprint of the European Union. This would seem to collide with Rodrik’s 
views on the need to learn and experiment with the right set of institutions for a specific country. 
However, it should be kept in mind that entry in the European Union is seen as one of the main 
objectives for the populations of Central-Eastern European countries, and it is likely that 
individuals’ beliefs are that European Union institutions represent the right institutions. 
 
 
 
4. Growth in Transition: The Empirical Literature 
The debate in the empirical literature on economic growth in transition economies has 
been mostly about establishing the relative importance of structural factors (broadly defined to 
include initial conditions) and policies (broadly defined to include both liberalization  and 
macroeconomic policies) in explaining the output performance. In what follows, we provide a 
general overview of this cross-country literature. Because of the large number of individual 
country studies, we focus on cross-country studies, in particular, those paying attention not only 
to Central and Eastern Europe, but also to the former Soviet Union countries. Notice that this 
criterion excludes many important contributions.
47 
The cross-country literature focused on three main issues: the effect on growth of 
liberalization, macroeconomic adjustment (mainly inflation control), and initial conditions. Only 
a few exceptions discuss the impact of institutions on growth (Oleh Havrylyshyn and Ron van 
                                                                 
47 Eduardo Borenzstein and Peter Montiel (1992) and Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1996) both 
examine only three transition countries. The former uses the augmented Solow framework to identify 
long term growth paths, while the latter uses three countries’ experience to argue that harmonizing with 
the European Union policy standards will result in lower growth rates than following the policies of the 
group the authors define as “very fast growing developing economies.” Another important study is Luca 
Barbone and Juan Zalduendo (1997), which estimates a model for a large sample of developing countries 
and then use the coefficients to discuss accession to the European Union of five Central and Eastern 
European countries. Edward Leamer and Mark Taylor (1994) provide a careful and original contribution 
that concludes with a number of hypothetical, although highly relevant scenarios, and the study by Vir 
Barta and Thomas Url (1996) examines five Central European transition countries. Individual country 
studies include, among others, Mark De Broeck and Kristina Kostial (1998) on  Kazakhstan, Daniel 
Berkowitz and David DeJong (1998) and Irina Dolinskaya (1999) on Russia, De Broek and Koen (2000b) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Rooden, 2000 and Martin Raiser, Christian Haerpfer, Thomas Nowotny and Claire Wallace, 
2001). 
 
 
4.1 Liberalization and growth 
De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996) and De Melo and Gelb (1997) map the output decline, 
construct an index of the extent of liberalization and offer evidence that cumulative liberalization 
is closely related to the observed output dynamics. Because this liberalization index is used 
widely, we should note two of its distinguishing features. First, the index is based on the still 
controversial notion that what accounts for the disparity in economic  performance during 
transition are government policies (De Melo and Gelb, 1997, pp. 62-63). Second, the index is a 
weighted-average of three components: liberalization of internal markets, of external markets 
and of private sector entry (weights are 0.3, 0.3 and 0.4 respectively).  All indices incorporate a 
significant dose of arbitrariness and judgement on the part of the researchers who built them. 
Even abstracting from the problem of the quality of the measures of liberalization, an important 
issue debated in the literature is whether liberalization has an impact on output performance 
through the cumulative level of liberalization achieved or through the change in liberalization 
indexes. In other words, there is an issue on the time dimension of the relationship between 
liberalization and growth. If one considers the cumulative index the effects of liberalization do 
not disappear after the current period. 
  Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996a) use the De Melo et al. liberalization indexes in a panel 
of 20 transition countries (for 1992-1994). They find that growth is positively and statistically 
significantly associated with fiscal surpluses, foreign aid, and the extent of liberalization, and is 
negatively and significantly associated with inflation. In subsequent work (1996b), the authors 
increase the number of countries (from 20 to 25, for 1992-1994) to conclude that growth is 
negatively and significantly associated with initial income, and positively and significantly 
associated with the choice of exchange rates regimes, fiscal surpluses, and the (cumulative) 
liberalization index. Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1998) quantify the income losses incurred during 
the socialist period: using 1937 data for 6 countries, they estimate that approximately two-thirds 
of GDP per capita were lost during the socialist experiment. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
on Poland, and Jeremin Zettlemeyer (1998) on Uzbekistan. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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  Anders Åslund, Peter Boone and Simon Johnson (1996) find that conclusions about the 
impact of macroeconomic policies change dramatically when considering output change 
(between 1989 and 1995) instead of output level at the end of the period (1995). For the first 
case, they report that once dummy variables for ruble zone and war-torn countries are included, 
“there is no robust significant correlation between output change and any measure of reform” 
(1996, p. 233). However, when they turn their attention to output levels in 1995, the extent of 
liberalization and inflation are found to be statistically significant and have the expected signs. 
 
 
4.2 Initial conditions and policies 
Denizer (1997) stresses the role of initial conditions and in doing so provides a finer depiction of 
the determinants of the various “transition patterns” identified in De Melo, Denizer and Gelb 
(1996). He finds that initial conditions matter, as proxied by distance from Vienna and whether 
the country was independent before socialism.  Besides the degree of arbitrariness in the choice 
of the relevant variables used as initial conditions, there is the issue of correlation between initial 
conditions and liberalization measures. One can argue that the extent of liberalization and the 
speed of reform is not independent of initial conditions. This is another instance in which 
existing empirical work is not derived from an underlying theory. In this regard, Berta Heybey 
and Peter Murrell (1997) identify a set of problems in the existing literature, notably with respect 
to the measurement of the speed of reform and the issue of simultaneity between output 
performance and reform policies. They tackle the problem by using a simultaneous equations 
approach, and conclude that initial conditions are “much more important than policy variables in 
determining growth performance” (1997, p. 15).
  
The debate on the relative importance of economic policies and initial conditions is likely 
to continue for some time.
48 On the one hand, there is evidence that policies are instrumental in 
explaining the recovery as argued by, among others, Marcelo Selowsky and Ricardo Martin 
(1997), Berg, Borenzstein, Sahay and Zettlemeyer (1999) and Oleh Havrylyshyn, Thomas Wolf, 
Julian Berengaut, Marta Castello-Branco, Ron van Rooden and Valerie Mercer-Blackman 
(1999).
49 On the other hand, Gary  Krueger and Marek Ciolko (1998) and Vladimir Popov 
                                                                 
48 Further, we must note the increasing attention political factors have received recently in this debate. See 
Castanheira and Popov (2000), Jan Fidrmuc (2000), and Roland (2000). 
49 Holger Wolf (1999) argues that liberalization is associated with the output fall and recovery.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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(1999), among others, provide evidence that the impact of liberalization becomes insignificant 
once initial conditions are accounted for. 
One of the main results achieved in the papers arguing on the dominant role of policies is 
that reform measures have an initial negative impact on growth but over time they determine 
positive growth, overcoming the initial adverse effect.  Havrylyshyn et al. (1999) conclude this 
by inserting lagged values of the reform indices in addition to the contemporaneous one.  
However, the opposite sign, and the similar magnitude, of the coefficients of contemporaneous 
and lagged reform indicators may simply reflect a problem of collinearity. The reform indicators 
are cumulative indices and thus are surely highly correlated over time. 
 
 
4.3 Asymmetric growth of state and private sectors 
Despite the central role that the asymmetric behavior of state and private sectors play in the 
theories of optimal speed of transition, most empirical analyses have focused on aggregate 
variables. The major obstacle for a disaggregated analysis is the lack of reliable data on private 
sector activity.  Nevertheless, there are a few exceptions in the empirical literature that try to test 
a model that takes into account the reallocation of resources from state to private sectors.  
Ernesto Hernandez-Cata (1997) puts forward a model of the transition that focuses on the 
reallocation of capital (from the state to the private sector), and relates the output fall to 
liberalization and stabilization. He also presents empirical results that support the view that the 
transition is to take considerable time as it involves, fundamentally, the restructuring of the 
inherited capital stock. In addition, his results confirm a strong association between price 
stabilization and the resumption of growth. Of particular interest is the finding that the much 
worse performance of former Soviet Union countries vis-à-vis those of Central and Eastern 
Europe, dissipate after controlling for the timing and intensity of liberalization, price stabilization 
and under-reporting of output. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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4.4 Institutions and growth 
As noted earlier the role of institutions has been largely neglected in the empirical analysis of 
growth in transition economies.  However a few exceptions are noteworthy.  In particular, two 
recent papers by Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000) and by Raiser et al. (2001) represent first 
attempts to provide a comprehensive study of the role of institutions on economic performance in 
transition economies. However, both studies remain valuable initial attempts, but are still far 
from a robust analysis of the relationship between institutions and growth in economies in 
transition.  
The paper by Havrylyshyn and van Rooden update their previous regressions on panel 
data for the period 1991-98 to include institutional variables. Nine institutional variables from 
five different sources are used. Because of the high degree of correlation among different 
variables, the authors used a principal component analysis. It turns out that the first principal 
component explains about 90 percent of overall variability of 8 institutional indices.  Inclusion of 
the institutional variable adds to the explanation of growth, although its contribution is small 
compared to structural reform and initial conditions.  A few cautioning notes are in order. First, 
institutional variables concern 1997, that is one of the last years of the sample. Second, 
institutional indicators are highly subjective. This comes out clearly if one looks at the 
correlations between different institutional indicators, correlations that are extremely high. One 
would certainly expect some correlations among these variables, however such high degree of 
correlation between legal, economic and political institutions is suspicious. Finally, the idea that 
institutional development has an immediate impact on growth, without attention to the possible 
time dimension of the relationship is striking in a regression in which the authors include a 
dynamic structure for the structural reform indicators.  What does the level of institutional 
development in 1997 tell us about growth rates during the period 1990-98?  Perhaps the authors 
assume that the cross-country variation in institutional development observed in 1997 is similar 
to the one observed throughout the period. Despite a valuable effort to collect data on 
institutional development, the work appears only a starting point in the analysis of institutions 
and growth in transition economies. 
 Similar comments apply to Raiser et al. (2001), who find some, though rather weak, 
evidence of positive impact of social capital on growth performance in transition economies. An 
interesting result is that social capital has a significant impact on growth, especially civic 
participation and trust in public institutions (especially the legal system and police), while reform William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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variables are not statistically significant. Interacting reform indicators and social capital to test 
whether reform are effective when social capital is sufficiently developed does not lead to 
significant results. However, much more work is needed.   
Perhaps, rather than continuing to rely on unnecessarily subjective reform indicators, 
more attention should be given to more objective measures such as financial development and 
specific policies aimed at improving the functioning of a market economy. Much of the 
empirical work carried out on transition economies is inevitably exploratory. There is a growing 
consensus on the importance of institutions. However, the channels through which institutions 
affect growth are not well understood. The time dimension of the relationship between 
institutions and growth is also still unclear. In light of the theoretical work discussed earlier it 
would be interesting to test the impact of institutional change, not only the impact of levels of 
institutional development. Because of the short time interval available for the empirical analysis 
it would seems reasonable to concentrate on the relationship between initial level of institutional 
development and economic performance. In particular, as underlined by the theoretical work, the 
effects of liberalization policies and of macroeconomic measures likely depend on such different 
initial level of institutional development. Interacting institutional variables with liberalization 
and macroeconomic policy measures seems a very promising research agenda.
50 In carrying out 
such an analysis one should also consider the endogeneity of reform measures, both in 
connection with economic performance and institutional development. Such endogeneity 
problems are discussed in the political economy literature (Roland, 2 000, Castanheira and 
Popov, 2000). 
  Similarly, the role of social safety nets as a fundamental institution for the functioning of 
a market economy, especially in a period of rapid structural change, should be tackled in the 
empirical analysis. 
51 
 
 
4.5  Growth prospects 
Finally, there is another worth mentioning strand of this empirical literature that discusses the 
growth prospects for economies in transition. One of the main findings of this literature is 
                                                                 
50 Coricelli and Campos (2000) present a preliminary test of these interactions, finding some significant 
results on the dependence of the effects of reform policies on initial conditions and on institutional 
development. 
51 Coricelli and Campos (2000) find a significant and positive impact of social expenditures on growth in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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instrumental because it establishes empirically that the underlying long-run trends are 
significantly different before and after 1989.
52 Using traditional growth equations (Barro, 1991, 
and Ross Levine and David Renelt, 1992) to extrapolate growth prospects of transition 
economies would lead to reasonably optimistic forecast, even though no “miracle” is foreseen.  
Indeed, growth rates are projected to hover at around 5 percent, that would imply a rather slow 
process of convergence to not only average income of European Union countries, but even to 
low income European countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain (Fischer et al.,  1998).  
Among the favorable factors fostering growth one can identify human capital 
development, although the caveats noted above apply. In the Barro specification, government 
consumption, that is rather high in transition economies, adversely affect growth. In light of the 
review of theories of previous sections, a fundamental factor that can hamper the process of 
convergence is the level of institutional development. Using Phil Keefer and Steve Knack (1995) 
specification, the EBRD Transition Report of 1997 concluded that growth prospects would be 
significantly reduced.  Such a conclusion is reached by comparing findings on future growth in 
transition countries (from Levine-Renelt specifications) with those from an alternative 
specification that includes an index of institutional development.
53 This comparison suggests a 
downward revision of the estimated long-run growth trend: even for those transition economies 
with relatively high-quality institutions (and for which, institutional data are available), the 
absence of further institutional change should, according to those calculations, lower long-term 
growth rates by 1.5 percentage points. 
 
 
5. Conclusion   
 Transition is the simultaneous change in economic structures and institutions and the 
final outcome crucially depends upon the coherence between economic reform in terms of 
liberalization of goods and factor markets, macroeconomic policies and institutional 
development. The collapse of output in Central-Eastern Europe and especially the Former Soviet 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
transition economies. 
52  This literature includes Denizer (1997), Peter Havlik (1996), and Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1997, 
1998).  
53  This is a composite index encompassing “expropriation risk”, “rule of law”, “risk of contract 
repudiation by the government”, “corruption”, and “quality of the bureaucracy” (EBRD, 1997, p. 106). 
The enlarged Levine-Renelt specification includes enrollment rates in primary school, changes in 
international prices, and growth of labor force (instead of population).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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Union indicated a lack of coherence in the reform strategies. In general, more attention to a 
comparative analysis of the experience of China could prove useful. Initial conditions and 
economic structure were sharply different in China. However, reform strategies differed as well. 
Therefore, the comparison with China highlights one of the main lessons that can be drawn from 
the first ten years of transition, namely that reform strategies cannot neglect the different 
institutional structures.   
From our review, a few suggestions for future research stand out. 
First, the list of stylized facts we offer are based on data currently available. We 
highlighted the limitations of these data series, both in terms of completeness and accuracy. A 
fundamental direction for future research is to try to validate these facts. More work should be 
devoted to examine the limitations and inadequacies of the various time series needed to study 
growth in the early transition years. For instance, re-calculations or re-valuations of the capital 
stocks are needed and in doing so, it is important to disentangle the roles of public and private 
investment. There should also be attempts to improve the available series on labor. In particular, 
future research should go beyond the number of workers and years of schooling and try to 
provide a more economically meaningful picture of the contribution of labor (specifically, in 
terms of hours worked and effective use of skills). More reliable estimates of physical, human 
capital and labor contributions to growth will improve our understanding of the sources of this 
process and the relative roles of various crucial factors. 
Second, research should focus more on institutions, including the role and size of the 
government. A clear specification of the channels through which institutions affect growth is 
needed. In this respect, a particularly relevant area for research should be the role of institutions 
for the development of financial markets. This extends beyond pure conceptual pursuits. Data on 
institutions based on objective criteria is also highly desirable. A last concern is the emphasis on 
cross-sectional data that we deem mistaken. Transition is a dynamic process and a crucial aspect 
of it has been the dynamics of institutional reform. The empirical efforts that attempt to put 
forward cross-sectional time series data on institutions in transition are few and admittedly crude 
at this point. One crucial suggestion for future research is to change this situation. 
Third, relevant measures of initial conditions should be provided. Moreover, it should be 
studied how they relate to degrees of distortions across sectors, across countries and over time.   
Fourth, more emphasis should be placed upon a better understanding of the role of 
economic reforms and reform strategies in dictating the path of the transition process. This William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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should be pursued both conceptually and empirically. There are a number of theoretical models 
that stress the role of reform strategies. Yet the data for discriminating among these models is 
lacking. The few indicators available are unnecessarily subjective and more often than not the 
needed documentation on their construction is not disclosed.  
Last, but not least, the transition experience raises simultaneously many new challenges 
to the conceptual frames we use to study economic growth and development. One key example 
of these new challenges are isolating reallocation (its sources and effects) from accumulation and 
technological progress. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 470 
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